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'Diss" has become an idiomatic expression for disrespect or disparagement. Although it is
pure slang, it seems to have been coined by rap musicians as a short and concise verb, "to diss,"
to express disrespect. See Lee Bey, Kickin' the Ballistics and Resurrecting Old Verbs; New
Dictionary Preserves Lively Language of Blacks, CHI. SuN-TIMMd, Aug. 28, 1994, Show Section,
at 14; Larry Fiquette, Do Your Own Thing, Reporters, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 12, 1994,
at 2A. "What a word," says one author. "Listen to it hissing at you snake-like, hurled through
clenched teeth with pure disdain. It sounds like you feel. My gosh, it's almost onomatopoeia..
. ." Jim Sollisch, Ask a Teacher, PLAIN DFALs (Cleveland, OH), July 31, 1994, Sunday section,
at 17.
- Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A. 1964, University of Chicago;
J.D. 1983, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I appreciate the very helpful comments of Jack Hiller,
Dave Myers, and Curt Cichowski on an earlier draft of this article. I am grateful to Peter Yelkovac
and Lynda Sloane, Class of 1994, for their excellent research assistance and to Terry Little for her
enthusiastic secretarial support. Thanks are also due to the School of Law and Valparaiso University
for the sabbatical leave that provided the time to think deeply about art and law.
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The subjects [of the world] are many. '
Leonardo da Vinci
I was interested in ideas-not merely in visual products ....
I wanted to put painting once again at the service of the mind.2
Marcel Duchamp
Only one thing is impossible to God, to find any sense in any
copyright law on this planet.3
Mark Twain
Many of you are familiar with La Giocanda, a/k/a the Mona Lisa, painted
by the very first "Renaissance Man," Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), some
1. 1 LEONARDO DA VINCI, THE NOTEBOOKS OF LEONARDO DA VINCI 12 (Jean Paul Richter
ed., 1970). 1 chose this subject for my inaugural lecture to honor the memory of my father, Irving
Schinder (1914-1993), who came to this country from Russia in 1922. He almost entered the legal
field but detoured permanently into the world of visual art reproductions and manufacture of
decorative accessories, negotiating for reproduction rights with such artista as Andrew Wyeth,
Walter Keane, and Peter Max. While considering the law, my father's first job as a quasi 'go-fer"
for a law firm was to evict tenants. He found it so distasteful and emotionally wrenching that it
nipped his legal interest in the bud. But the stage was certainly set for my appreciation of art and
interest in the legal profession. Of course, I do not teach anything about forcible entry and detainer.
2. CAROL STRICKLAND & JOHN BOSWELL, THE ANNOTATED MONA LIsA 148 (1992).
3. MARK TWAIN, NOTEBOOK 381 (1935 ed.). Cf. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (stating that copyright and patent laws involve cases which
approach, more than any other type of case, "the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are,
or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent").
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time between 1503 and 1505.' Perhaps a few of you remember that, as school-
children, one of the earliest acts of "up the establishment" may have been for
you or one of your grammar school buddies to draw a moustache on a picture
of your first grade teacher or another similar icon of your youth. Depending
upon your age today, you may even have accomplished this deed before Marcel
Duchamp (1887-1968) did so in 1919, when he added a moustache to his
[in]famous replica of Leonardo's Mona Lisa. If we were to manipulate time,
place, and some other facts, the moustachioed Mona Lisa would raise questions
of classic copyright infringement6 as well as pose a serious affront to
Leonardo's artistic reputation; that is, his moral rights, specifically the right of
integrity. 7
4. Leonardo's portrait has been described as enigmatic and mysterious. It is at once a rendition
of a particular individual, probably the wife of a Florentine merchant named Giocondo, and an
expression of the High Renaissance ideal of woman. The woman's features, her half-smile, and the
"sfumato" (hazy) background have intrigued viewers for more than four hundred years, inspiring
songsters (Nat King Cole's "Mona Lisa") and other artists, including Marcel Duchamp. The Mona
Lisa is "the most reproduced ... image in all art." STRICKLAND & BOSWELL, supra note 2, at 34.
To some, the portrait "embodies a quality of maternal tenderness which was to Leonardo the essence
of womanhood." H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 421 (2d ed. 1977). It has been suggested by
computer artist Lillian Schwartz that the Mona Lisa is actually a self-portrait of Leonardo. See
Louis Montana, Commercial Applications of Realist Art." Lillian Schwartz, 54 AMERICAN ARTIST
60-65 (1990). If this is so, then maybe Duchamp's moustache reveals Leonardo's "secret."
It is conceivable that Leonardo may have used parody in the Mona Lisa. Her intriguing smile
evokes the "Archaic smile" of Greek figures of the fifth and sixth centuries B.C. See JANSON,
supra, at 101, 421.
5. Duchamp was one of the founders of the post-World War I artistic movement self-titled:
"Dada." Dada allegedly was a random word choice, considered an infantile "all-purpose" word,
Dads, in part, stood for anti-art and was a reaction to the senseless destruction caused by the War.
Duchamp is probably most remembered for his 1912 Nude Descending a Staircase, No. 2, a cubist
portrait of a woman's continuous motion as she walks down a flight of stairs. See generally
JANSON, supra note 4, at 660 & fig. 820. The Alude was the most talked about hit of the famous
1913 Armory show in New York, which showed 1600 modern works. See MARCEL JEAN, THE
HISTORY OF SURREALIST PAINTINGS 31 (1960). The Armory Show, exhibiting works of such artists
as Duchamp, Matisse, and Picasso, has been called the "most significant art show in American
History" because "it burst the bubble of American provincialism." The N. Y. 7Tmes called the show
"pathological." Public officials demanded the closing of the Armory show "to safeguard public
morals." STRICKLAND & BOSWELL, supra note 2, at 150.
In addition to his jibe at Leonardo, Duchamp also took on Cizanne: a framed toy monkey's
title-Portrait of COzanne. JANSON, supra note 4, at 660. For insight into Duchamp's creative
mind, combining both wit and scientific precision, see MARCEL DUCHAMP, THE BRIDE STRIPPED
BARE BY HER BACHELORS, EVEN (George Heard Hamilton trans., 1960). In fact, Duchamp's
mathematical precision is not unlike that with which Leonardo planned his paintings. Mona Lisa
is drawn in the shape of a truncated cone, one example of Leonardo's thinking that "every branch
of knowledge ... dovetail[s] with every other." LIANA BORTOLON, THE LIFE, TIMES AND ART
OF LEONARDO 72 (1965).
6. For example, the Copyright Act provides to an "author" the exclusive right to reproduce his
or her work, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993), and to prepare derivative works 17
U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V. 1993). See also infra notes 177-200 and accompanying text.
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When Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA) as
a measure subsequent to the United States joining the Berne Convention,9 it
represented the first explicit federal recognition of the continental European
notion of the protection of an artist's moral rights,'0 specifically the rights of
8. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
9. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(Oct. 31, 1988), eff. Mar. 1, 1989. Article 6 ' of the Berne Convention for The Protection of
Uterary and Artistic Works (Paris Text, 1971) provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall,
after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall
be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of the country
where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment
of their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after
the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide
that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Uterary and Artistic Property, Sept. 9, 1886, 123 L.N.T.S.
233, reprinted in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO 1982), as revised
in Paris on July 24, 1971, art. 6".
As of 1985, 76 nations adhered to the Berne Convention, which was signed initially in 1886
and which is the oldest multilateral treaty providing for copyright protection. Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1,
10 & n.38 (1985). In order to join the Berne Convention, which required member nations to afford
moral rights protection, see Art. 6"w", the United States had to represent that moral rights were
already given some protection by various methods, including the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1976), which, until VARA, did not afford explicit protection for moral rights. See S.
REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Ses. 9-10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3714-15. See also
Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention 35,
published in 10 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 513 (1986).
10. Several authors have examined the nature and extent of moral rights. See, e.g., Robert A.
Jacobs, Work-For-Hire and the Moral Right Dilemma in the European Community: A U.S.
Perspective, 16 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 29 (1993); John M. Kernochan, Moral Rights in U.S.
Theatrical Productions: A Possible Paradigm, 17 CoLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 385 (1993); Brett
Sirota, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights, 21 HoFSTRA L.
REv. 461 (1992); Moana Weir, Making Sense of Copyright Law Relating to Parody: A Moral Rights
Perspective, 18 MONASH U. L. REV. 194 (1992); Patrick G. Zabatta, Note, Moral Rights and
Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095 (1992); Joseph Zuber,
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990--What it Does, and What it Preempts, 23 PAC. LJ. 445
(1992); Otto W. Konrad, A Federal Recognition of Performance Art Author Moral Rights, 48 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1579 (1991); Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward
a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REv 945 (1990); Eric
M. Brooks, Comment, "77lted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights after U.S. Adherence
tothe Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431 (1989); Lawrence Adam Beyer, intendonalism, Art,
and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1011 (1988); Kwall, supra note 9; Sydney A. Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral
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attribution and integrity." To date, there has been little litigation brought
under VARA. Thus, in assessing the proper balance between protection of an
artist's moral rights, the fairness of an alleged infringer's use of the artist's
work in parodying that work, and society's interest in providing incentives to
create more art, this Article is, in one sense, writing on a clean slate. But prior
case law focusing on parody and fair use,' 2 especially the recent Supreme
Court decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. , as well as a significant
body of literature which addresses the parody and fair use issue in the non-moral
rights context, 4 does inform the discussion herein which is based on the
Rights" of Authors and Other Creators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244 (1978); John Henry Merryman,
•The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023 (1976); Raymond Sarraute, Current
Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 Am. J. Comr. L. 465
(1968); William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 Am. J. COMP. L. 506 (1955); Martin A.
Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53
HARV. L. Rnv. 554 (1940).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106A provides in relevant part:
(a) Rights of Attribution and Integrity.-Subject to section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art-
(1) shall have the right-
(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author
of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or
reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the
right-
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other
modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his or
her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that
right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature,
and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work
is a violation of that right.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
12. See infra notes 249-316 and accompanying text.
13. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
14. See, e.g., William F. Patty & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit,
Presumptions, and Parody, 11 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993); Brian R. Landy, Comment,
The Two Strands of the Fair Use Web: A Theoy for Resolving the Dilemma of Music Parody, 54
OHIO ST. L.J. 227 (1993); E. Kenley Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koona: A Fair Use Standard
for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993); Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?,
21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and
Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79 (1991); Charles J. Sanders & Steven R.
Gordon, Stranger in Parodies: Weird Al and the Law of Musical Satire, 1 FORDHAM ENT. MEDIA
& INT. PROP. L. FORUM 11 (1990); Michael A. Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective Scope
of the Fair Use Defense to Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12 COLUM.-VLA
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following hypothetical facts.
I am now about to go back to the future. Assume that sometime after June
1, 1991,5 our modem Leonardo executed a portrait of La Giocanda and made
a limited edition of 100 lithographs. He numbered them consecutively, e.g.,
1/100, 2/100, etc., and signed each one. 6 Leonardo complied with all
provisions of the relevant copyright act.' 7 Assume also that in July 1991, our
modem Marcel Duchamp bought one of these lithographs and added a
moustache to the face of Mona Lisa, not unlike what Duchamp actually did in
1919. Duchamp then exhibited this picture at a local art gallery. On October
1, 1994, in the federal district court for the Northern District of Indiana,
Leonardo filed a complaint, alleging, inter alia,is copyright infringement based
on VARA. 19 Duchamp answered the complaint in typical fashion. He moved
J.L. & ARTS 229 (1988); Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel,
Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923 (1985); Charles C.
Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment
Protection, 3 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the
Economic Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REV 615 (1979). There is also an excellent treatise
on the subject. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (BNA)
(1985).
15. In order to receive federal protection under VARA against interference with the right of
integrity, a work must be destroyed, distorted, mutilated, or modified after June 1991, the effective
date of VARA. Pub. L. No, 101-650, Tit. VI, § 610, 104 Stat. 5128 (Dec. 1, 1990).
16. Our modern Leonardo's work qualifies asa work of visual art protected byVARA. Section
101 defines a work of visual art thusly:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures
of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature
or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a
single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer
that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993).
17. Leonardo's "modem" Mona Lisa is protected by copyright as it qualifies as an "original
work .. .of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988
& Supp. V 1993). As a pictorial work created after March 1, 1989, affixation of copyright notice,
registration of the work in the copyright office, and recordation as a precondition to suit are
discretionary not mandatory. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401, 408, 411, 412 (1976).
18. The claims might include copyright infringement under §§ 106(1), 106(2); an unfair
competition claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988); and assorted
state claims such as state unfair competition, defamation, and misrepresentation.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A) (Supp. V 1993) (violation of rights of attribution and integrity).
Federal question jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338 (1988). We will assume that
venue is appropriate in Hammond, Indiana, as Duchamp or his agent either resides or is found there.
28 U.S.C. § 1400 (1984). We will also assume that personal jurisdiction over Duchamp is also
available in the Hammond federal district court. See Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Fjeld
Mfg. Co., 8 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 1993).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/8
1995] THE "DISSING " OF DA VINCI 941
to dismiss for failure to state a claim 2o or alternatively for summary
judgment2 claiming: (1) he did not infringe; and (2) even if he did, his use
is a fair one,' based on parody, which immunizes his alleged infringement.
The case of Leonardo v. Duchamp may well be one of first impression in the
federal district court in Hammond, Indiana, or indeed in any federal court.'
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). There are alternate views about whether fair use can be raised
in a motion to dismiss. Compare Chicago Lawyer, Ltd. v. Forty-Sixth Ward Regular Democratic
Org., 220 U.S.P.Q. 511 (N.D. 111. 1982) (stating that a motion to dismiss is not appropriate) with
Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (holding that a
defendant may bring a motion to dismiss based on fair use).
21. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Fair use is a factual determination. D. C. Comics, Inc. v. Reel
Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982). Thus, where there are no genuine issues of material
facts in dispute, a defendant could conceivably succeed on a motion for summary judgment.
22. The moral rights given to visual artists are tempered explicitly by section 106(A): "Subject
to section 107 . . . ." 17 U.S.C. §106A (Supp. V 1993). Section 107 delineates fair use:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors. (As amended, Pub.L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990);
Pub.L. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992)).
17 U.S.C. §107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. Since the effective date of VARA, June 1991, there has been only one reported case
brought under the Act. In Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),
three sculptors sought to prevent building owners from dismantling a large sculptural installation
from the lobby of a former Macy's warehouse in Queens, New York. On May 18, 1994, Judge
Edelstein granted to the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction which permitted them to visit the
unfinished work and which restricted the defendants from removing the scultpure. The ruling was
based on the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants attempted removal would "deface, modify, or
mutilate" the work in violation of § 106A(a)(2), (3). Carter, 852 F. Supp. at 229. Plaintiffs also
raised several supplemental state law claims. Id. On Aug. 31, 1994, Judge Edelstein recognized
the VARA claim and enjoined the defendants from removing the work from the lobby, because
moving it would require destruction of the elements of the work. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.,
861 F. Supp. 803, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The issues raised in Carter are not new. In 1980, the New York branch of The Bank of
Tokyo cut up and removed a large sculpture by the noted artist and architect, Isamu Noguchi, from
the bank's Wall Street office. Grace Glueck, Abstract, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1980, § 1, at 1. This
occurred more than a decade before VARA and more than five years before a New York moral
rights statute became effective. Thus Noguchi, unlike the Carter sculptors, had no remedy. See
Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84
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The imaginary juxtaposition of these two artists is not without some
logic.' Leonardo's renown persists through the centuries not only because of
his few, but incredibly beautiful paintings, such as The Last Supper, the Mona
Lisa, and The Virgin of the Rocks, but because of his encompassing vision of the
artist as inventor, scientist, physicist, and architect, which led to innumerable
detailed drawings of flying machines, embryos in the womb, human anatomy
and a host of other subjects. His approach to these drawings was scientific and
analytical. Leonardo believed that artists should "know not only the rules of
perspective but also all laws of nature . . . . "' In short, Leonardo tried to
bridge the gap between art and craft, between painting and science. Similarly,
in his "Ready-Mades," for example, a very slightly embellished bicycle, urinal,
or bottlerack, and in his precise, scientific drawings that are "a sort of
mathematics of signs and significations,'" Duchamp, like Leonardo, attempted
to bridge the gap between art and science. Thus, in one sense perhaps,
L. H. 0.0. Q. (the moustached Mona Lisa)' represents a conscious or
subconscious attempt to link Duchamp with Leonardo-art as science; art as
both homage and critique.
COLUM. L. REv. 1733 (1984). However, the New York statute, N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law §
14.03 (McKinney Supp. 1991), does not protect the artist against destruction of the work. See
Zuber, supra note 10, at 465. Q. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1949) (holding that an artist had no remedy when the defendant obliterated a church fresco
painted by him). Crimi was decided before the New York Act.
In a Canadian case brought on similar facts, a sculptor was successful in preventing the
Toronto Eaton Centre from tying Christmas ribbons around the necks of the 60 geese making up his
sculpture Snow v The Eaton Centre Ltd., 70 C.P.R.2d 105 (Ont. H.C. 1982). The plaintiff
claimed that the ribbons around the necks of the geese were similar to dangling earrings on the
Venus de Milo. Id. Canadian copyright law has an express provision for protection of the right to
integrity, Copyright Act, R.S., c. C-30 §§ 14.1-14.2, 28.1, 28.2 (1970). Authors of paintings,
sculptures, and engravings do not have to show prejudice to honor or reputation, as do other
authors. Rather, the distortion, modification, or mutilation of these works are presumed to cause
the requisite harm. Id. § 28.2(2). See generally LESLEY ELLEN HARRIS, CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
LAW (1992).
24. The artificial placing of two or more chronologically and/or geographically separate
individuals who interact in the same place and time is a frequent literary device. See, e.g., E.L.
DOCTOROW, RAGTIME (1974) (book involving Henry Ford, Emma Goldman, Harry Houdini, J.P.
Morgan, Theodore Dreiser, Sigmund Freud, and Emiliano Zapata); TOM STOPPARD, TRAVESTIES
(1974) (play involving Lenin, James Joyce, and Tristan Tzara, a noted and early Dada-ist; Travesties
is itself a parody of OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST (1895)); STEVE MARTIN,
PICASSO AT THE LAPIN AoILE (1993) (play where Picasso and Einstein meet at the noted Parisian
bistro).
25. JANSON, supra note 4, at 421.
26. MARCEL JEAN, THE HISTORY OF SURREALIST PAINTING.36 (1960). In Venice, the 1993
Biennale presented a Duchamp retrospective at the Palazzo Grassi which contained several of his
"Ready-Mades," paintings, and drawings. The impetus for this article was formed when I viewed
this exhibit.
27. L.H.O.O. Q. is Duchamp's title for the mustached Mona Lisa. See infra text accompanying
notes 227-28.
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This Article will discuss the appropriate resolution of the moral rights
issues raised in Leonardo v. Duchamp. Perforce, after a brief introduction
describing the nature of copyright protection," the discussion will focus on the
current state of moral rights protection (Part II)," parody,' and fair use (Part
III). Part IV will then propose that fair use, based on a parody which
infringes upon an artist's moral right of integrity,32 should be given a wide
berth.33 Put another way, an artist's moral right of integrity should in most
circumstances yield, under fair use, to the right of the parodist. Part IV will
also explore other means of resolving the tension between parody and moral
rights, including a per se rule of non-liability, based either on copyright law or
First Amendment considerations,' a limitation of remedies where the use is
determined to be unfair,35 and the availability of a compulsory license for the
parodist.' This Article concludes that these alternatives will not be as
effective a solution as an interpretation of fair use that presumes a parodist's use
is fair when section 106A rights of integrity are at stake.
I. INTRODUCTION: A VERY BRIEF GUIDE
TO CURRENT COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
Our copyright law can be directly traced to sixteenth century England. In
order to stem a rising tide of Protestant heresy and political opposition, the
reigning monarch bestowed a publishing monopoly on a group of loyal subjects
-the Stationers Company. The group agreed not to publish objectionable books
in exchange for exclusive publishing privileges.3" By the late seventeenth
century, the official license expired leaving the publishing field unregulated.
Some years later, Parliament attempted to impose some order and, in 1710,
enacted the Statute of Anne,' the first copyright act. United States copyright
law was modeled after the Statute of Anne and based on a constitutional
provision which urged Congress "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 39 Since the first United
28. See infra notes 37-68 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 69-200 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 201-72 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 273-322 and accompanying text.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
33. See infra notes 323-404 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 355-65 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 347-54 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 328-46 and accompanying text.
37. See generaUy LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERsPECTIVE (1968);
B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CoPYRIOHr (1967).
38. 8 Anne, Ch. 19 (1710).
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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States Copyright Act of 1790,' there were significant revisions in 1831, and
1870, and a major overhaul resulting in the Copyright Act of 19094I which
lasted until the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended from time to time until the
present date.42
The remainder of this introduction will focus on the "pre-moral rights"
1976 Act. Part II will then address the concept of moral rights and explain how
it fits, not necessarily too comfortably, into the present copyright scheme.
Until the enactment of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA),
4 3
the focus of the 1976 Copyright Act was the protection of the pecuniary rights
of copyright owners. 4 The Copyright Act grants owners a bundle of exclusive
economic rights: to reproduce the protected work; to prepare derivative works;
to distribute copies by sale, transfer, rental, lease, or lending; to perform
publicly certain types of works; and to display publicly certain types of
works. 45 These rights are then tempered in two ways: generally, by the fair
use provisions of section 107 and by more specific limitations enunciated in
sections 108 through 120.' Thus, it can fairly be said that section 106
"giveth" certain rights but that sections 108 through 120 "taketh away" some
of the broad statements of economic rights contained in section 106. In any
event, due to explicit constitutional time constraints,47 protection is afforded the
copyright owner for the life of the author plus fifty years or, in certain cases,
seventy-five years from publication or 100 years from publication or creation,
whichever expires first.'
40. Act of May 31, 1790, Ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 1-601 (1909 Act).
42. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1933 & Supp. V 1993). A full discussion of both the 1909 and
1976 Acts can be found in Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of The Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 856 (1978). There are a number of excellent treatises on copyright law. See, e.g.,
DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(1992); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT (1989); MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT
LAW (1989); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1992).
43. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Tit. VI, § 610, 104 Stat. 5128 (Dec. 1, 1990), codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A (Supp. V 1993).
44. A copyright owner could be the author, an employer, one who commissions a certain type
of work under the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) or (2), or someone who now owns the copyright
due to transfer of ownership under the provisions of 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-05 (1988).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(5) (1988).
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-20 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
47. The Constitution mandates that copyright and patent protection be "for limited Times."
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 8. In contrast, the other part of the intellectual property triumvirate,
trademark protection, can subsist as long as a mark is used properly as a trademark. This potentially
unlimited duration is due to trademark's different constitutional source-the commerce clause. U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. See generally The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (as amended)
(1988). Patent protection is afforded by the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988).
48. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-303, 305 (1988), § 304 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Works protected by copyright comprise such diverse matter as literary and
artistic works, including pantomimes, sculpture, audiovisual works, sound
recordings, architectural works, and musical works,4 9 as well as compilations
of such.' Maps,t case reports, 52 computer programs," an artistic lamp
base,' a circus advertisement,' yellow, but not white pages of a telephone
directory,' ornamental belt buckles,'1 and this Article are just a few examples
of copyrightable subject matter. Provided that these examples and other subject
matter fulfill the constitutional requirement of originality and authorship,' are
fixed in a "tangible medium of expression,"' and do not smack of ideas,
principles, systems, methods, or such,' then copyright protection attaches at
creation, that is, when the work is fixed in a copy or phonorecord. 6'
The formalities of copyright notice, deposit of works for the Library of
Congress, and registration with the Register of Copyrights vary, but since the
Berne Implementation Act of 1988,' notice is permissive for works published
after March 1, 1989. Further, for Berne country works, registration is no
longer required as a precondition for an infringement suit, nor is recordation
required as a precondition to suit.'
The pecuniary protection afforded copyright owners by the 1976 Act is the
ability to prevent and be compensated for wrongful use of the particular work.
49. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988)..
51. United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978).
52. West Pub. Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
53. Whelan Aasocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cen. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Professor Oddi has argued that protection for
computer programs fits more comfortably within the patent scheme. See A. Samuel Oddi, An
Uneasier Case for Copyright than for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 72 NEB. L. REv.
351 (1993).
54. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). Cf. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (finding that the overall shape of an outdoor lighting fixture is an uncopyrightable
industrial design rather than a work of applied art).
55. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
56. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
57. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 340.
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993).
62. Pub. L. No. 100-568 (1988). The Berne copyright amendments afforded the United States
the chance to join the Berne Union, the largest international copyright convention. Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, July 24, 1971.
63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Such unpermitted use of the protected work constitutes infringement.
Infringement occurs when an unauthorized party violates one or more of the
exclusive bundle of rights afforded by section 106, such as the right to
reproduce, to make derivative works, to distribute, to display, or to perform.
64
To prove infringement, the copyright owner must prove a valid copyright in the
work and copying by defendant. Copying is indicated by showing that the
defendant's work is substantially similar' to the plaintiff's and not the product
of independent creation and, also, that direct or circumstantial evidence indicates
that the defendant had access'e to the plaintiff's work. Remedies include
injunctive relief, impounding of infringing copies, actual damages and profits,
or statutory damages ranging from $200 to $100,000. As a discretionary
matter, the court may also award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party.'
The above "cut to the chase" description of the property rights and
remedies afforded by the 1976 Act is sufficient to set the stage for an
examination of the history of moral rights and its recent adoption, in part, in this
country. As will be shown, the European concept of moral rights differs
significantly from the English and American copyright models and fits, as a
newcomer to our shores, somewhat uneasily into our copyright scheme.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
65. See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that there
were many common errors in plaintiff's and defendant's guides for baseball card prices).
66. Compare Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (stating that the plaintiff's very popular song, "He's So Fine," played extensively
on the radio and, thus, George Harrison must have heard it and unintentionally copied it) with Selle
v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the defendants Bee Gees' song did not infringe
as the plaintiff's song had very limited exposure only in the Chicago area, whereas the Bee Gees'
"How Deep is Your Love" was created in a French chateau studio).
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
68. Id. at § 505. See also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994) (prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants are to be treated alike; defendant need not show that plaintiff's suit was
frivolous or in bad faith).
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II. MORAL RIGHTS
"No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money.'
"NOT! "' (or, at least, not entirely true).
"Art is the most intense mode of individualism the world has
known. "71
A. The European Experience
The concept of moral rights, from the French droit moral, is based upon
the notion that an artist expresses his or her individualism and personality, in his
or her art: that, in effect, we cannot "know the dancer from the dance."'
Moral rights encompass personality rights,' which inure to the artist as creator
and which protect the artistic integrity of the artist's creation and require
recognition of the artist as author/creator.74
In any one country, the bundle of personal moral rights may also include
the right of disclosure (the exclusive ability to decide when or if the work should
be disseminated publicly), the right of withdrawal (the exclusive ability after
publication of the work to recall all existing copies of the work), and the right
to prevent excessive criticism whose only focus is to abuse the author.75 As
69. JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLE'a'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, Samuel Johnson, 355, quote #20
(15th ed. 1980).
70. My use of this word does not infringe on any "Wayne's World" skit as "words and short
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans" are not copyrightable. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1989).
71. GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 744 (1993) (quoting Oscar Wilde). Cf. JOHN
RUSKIN, THE STONES OF VENICE ch. 4 (1851-1853) ("All great art is the work of the whole living
creature, body and soul, and chiefly of the soul."). Oscar Wilde made, incidentally, his own history
in the U.S. copyright scheme. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884),
the Court concluded that a commercial photography studio portrait of Oscar Wilde constituted
protected copyrightable subject matter.
72. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, THE TowER, AMONG SCHOOL CHILDREN, stanza 8 (1928).
73. 1 S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC AND LITERARY PROPERTY §
272 (1938). The author uses the German word "urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht," translated as 'right
of the author's personality."
74. Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right ofAuthors andArtists Under French
Law, 16 AM. J. CoMp. L. 465, 478 (1968). The latter right is known as the "right of paternity."
Id.
'75. Kwall, supra note 9, at 5-8. Another right that is both personal and explicitly pecuniary
is the "droit de suite," or resale royalty provision, which requires the owner of a work of art, should
it be resold, to pay a percentage of the resale price to the artist, even if the artist is no longer the
copyright owner. The droit de suite is a French concept dating from 1920. See generally John
Henry Merryman, 7he Wrath of Robert Rauschenberg, 40 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 241 (1993); Elliot
C. Alderman, Resale Royalties in the United States for Fine Visual Artists: An Alien Concept, 40
J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 265 (1993); Shira Perlmutter, Resale Royalties for Artists: An Analysis of the
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of 1981, there were approximately three dozen countries in Asia, Africa,
Europe, and South America that recognized one or more of the personal, moral
rights of artists.76 Predominantly, these countries were and are civil, rather
than common law, jurisdictions. It is in these countries, especially perhaps in
France,' Italy,' and Germany,' that the eighteenth century romantic
Register of Copyrights" Report, 40 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 284 (1993); Carol Sky, Report of the
Register of Copyrights Concerning Droit de Suite, the Arist's Resale Royalty: A Response, 40 J.
COPYRIGHT SocIErY 315 (1993). The authors split 2/2 on the advisability of droit de suite in this
country: Merryman and Alderman against; Perlmutter and Sky believe it worth exploring. A
constitutional challenge to California's Resale Royalty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (West 1982), was
rejected. See Morseburg v. Balyon, 201 U.S.P.Q. 518 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
76. Kwall, supra note 9, at 97-100.
77. Law No. 57-298 on Literary and Artistic Property, Mar. 11, 1957, arts. 6, 19, 32 (the
inalienable right of paternity, the right of disclosure, and right of withdrawal when the artist agrees
to indemnify the owner of the work). Kwall, supra note 9, at 98. France is thought to be the
foremost exponent of an artist's personal rights, Russell J. Da Silva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 2 (1980), followed by Germany and Italy. See Diamond,
supra note 10, at 247.
A leading scholar on civil law systems, notes:
The moral right of the artist in French law is entirely judicial in origin. This is in itself
remarkable, since one of the most treasured tenets of the conventional wisdom about the
civil law is that law is made by legislators and executives, not by judges. The
development of the moral right of the artist is merely another example of the extent to
which this tattered brocard is inapplicable to France.
JOHN HENRY, MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ErHICS, AND rHL ViSuAL ARrs 144 (1987).
See also Jack A. Hiller, The Law-Creative Role of Appellate Courts in the Third World, 226-27 &
nn.270-77 (1994), in ESSAYS ON THIRD WORLD PERSPECrivES IN JURISPRUDENCE(M.L. Marisinghe
& William E. Conklin eds., 1994); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST AsIA (1994).
78. Law for Protection of Copyright and Other Rights Connected with the Exercise Thereof,
No. 633, Apr. 22, 1941, as amended up to January 8, 1979, Arts. 20, 142 (rights of paternity,
integrity, and withdrawal subject to indemnity). Kwall, supra note 9, at 99. In an illustrative Italian
case, De Chirico v. Ente Autonomo "La Biennale" di Venezia, [1951] Diritto de Autori 220, [1951]
Temi 568, [1952] 50 Rivista Diritto Commerciale [Riv. Dir. Comm.] 11, 128 (Tribunal di Venezia)
(note by Fioretta), the trial court ruled in favor of artist Giorgio de Chirico's claim that a proposed
exhibition of a number of the artist's works in the Biennale misrepresented him by including too
many early works and not including enough later works. Merryman, supra note 10, at 1032-33 &
nn.27-3 1.
79. Act dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, Sept. 9, 1965, as amended up to Mar. 2,
1974, Arts. 12-14, 42, 46(4) (rights of disclosure, paternity, integrity, to revoke a license with
indemnity if the work no longer reflects artist's views). Kwall, supra note 9, at 98.
The "Rocky Island with Sirens" case, 79 RGZ 397, June 8, 1912, is typical. By commission,
the plaintiff painted a mural in the stairway of the defendant's home. The homeowner objected to
the naked sirens and had them painted with clothing. The court said that the homeowner violated
the artist's right against unauthorized changes. Strauss, supra note 10, at 510 n.22.
Moral rights are on the march. There is sentiment within the European Community urging
the strengthening of moral rights, especially in connection with the film industry. See EC Moral
Rights Measures Proposed, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., Nov. 1993, at 34. In May 1991, the former
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet passed a law granting authors and their heirs the right of integrity, among
others. See Eric J. Schwartz, Recent Developments in The Copyright Regimes of the Soviet Union
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notions of authorship took hold: art as an expression of the unique personality
of an author who captures and records the very essence of culture.' Once
artists are regarded in this manner, it is practically inevitable that legal doctrine
will appear to protect the personal, if not also the pecuniary, rights of artists.
It would be helpful at this point to examine several French cases, brought
on the basis of a moral rights violation, which illustrate how the concept of
moral rights is a powerful tool in an artist's hands. Perhaps, the paradigmatic
moral rights case is the one involving the painter Bernhard Buffet and his
refrigerator."1 Buffet painted a refrigerator's six sides and regarded the
finished piece as one painting, thus signing only one of the panels. After
auctioning the refrigerator, Buffet became aware of another auction that offered
one of the six painted panels. He sued to prevent this sale because he regarded
the six-panelled work as an indivisible artistic whole. The Paris Court of
Appeals agreed and the Court of Cassation affirmed that this violated Buffet's
right of integrity and ordered that there be no separate sale of one panel.'
Three other French decisions confirm France's commitment to moral rights
by recognizing the special bond that exists between creator and creation. A late
nineteenth century case involved James McNeil Whistler, the son of Whistler's
Mother. Lord Eden commissioned a portrait of his wife. Whistler painted the
portrait, altered it, and refused to deliver the portrait to Lord and Lady Eden.
When Lord Eden sued Whistler, the court held that Eden should receive
restitution and damages for Whistler's breach of contract, but that Whistler
would be required neither to restore nor to deliver the commissioned portrait.u
Half a century later, the Russian composer Dimitry Shostakovich met with
similar success in French courts. Twentieth Century-Fox distributed a movie,
The Iron Curtain, with a decidedly anti-Soviet theme. (The halcyon days of
World War II "friendship" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had quickly
palled). The picture depicted Soviet espionage in Canada and contained
approximately forty-five minutes of music, credited to all individual composers
including Shostakovich. Shostakovich sought to enjoin the use of his name and
and Eastem Europe, 38 J. ColHT Soc'Y 123 (1991).
80. See generally Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 293 (1992); see also Christopher Aide, A More
Comprehensive Soul: Romantic Conceptions of Authorship and the Copyright Doctrine of Moral
Right, 48 U. TORONTO FAC. L. Ray. 211 (1990).
81. See generally John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HATNGs L.J.
1023 (1976).
82. Buffet v. Fersing, 1962, Cour d'appel, Paris, Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jr.] 570, affrd
1965, Cour de Cassation. See generally Merryman, supra note 81.
83. Edenv. Whistler, 1898 Recuel Piriodiqueet Critique [D.P.] U. 465 (Courd'appel, Paris),
aff'd, 1900 D.P.I. 497 (Cass. Civ.). See also Merryman, supra note 81, at 1024, 1028; Saurraute,
supra note 10, at 467-68.
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music in the picture and in any advertising or publicity matter relating to the
film claiming that his moral right as a composer was violated because the use
of his music indicated his "'approval'," "'endorsement'," and "'participation'"
in an anti-Soviet theme thereby "'false[ly] imput[ing] disloyal[ty]'" to his
country." (It may be that Shostakovich had more at stake than his moral rights
as an artist. The Stalinist purges and "show trials" took place less than a decade
prior to the movie's release, the "Cold War" was in full bloom, and the
silencing of any "un-Soviet spirit in literature and the arts by Zhdanov, next to
Stalin, the most important Politburo member,"' posed a real and potent threat
to both artistic integrity and the artist's life itself). The French court ruled in
favor of Shostakovich, ordered the film seized, and declared that Shostakovich
sustained "moral damage."'
In a more recent moral rights case brought in France, the court in 1991
again ruled in favor of an artist's personal rights. In Huston v. Societ. de
I'Exploitation de la Cinquieme Chdine,"7 the estate of director John Hustons
sued to enjoin a French television broadcast of a colorized version' of
84. These facts are taken from the identical case brought in New York, see Shostakovich v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948) (quoting the
plaintiff's argument), but the composer was not successful in the New York case.
85. JESSE D. CLARKSON, A HISTORY OF RUSSIA 614-19, 694-705, 714-17, 735-37 (Random
House 1962). In 1948, Zhadanov conferred with Soviet musicians who, in accord with the new
'Decree of Music," confessed their errors. Id. at 717. 'Shostakovich,thoroughlychastened, turned
out political potboilers in Hollywood vein and was rewarded by being sent to New York in 1949 for
the 'Congress in Defense of Peace'." Id.
86. Soc. Le Chant du Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe (Cour d'appel, Paris, Jan. 13, 1953, Dallez,
Jurisprudence [D. Jr.] 16, 80). See also William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM J.
COMP. L. 506, 534-35 n.56 (1955). Strauss, then Attorney Advisor, Copyright Office, Library of
Congress, worries about the result in the French Shostakovich case: "To arm a composer with the
right to suppress the use of his music in a film because he disapproves of the political view
expressed in the film, would come close to censorship and would have little, if anything, to do with
the protection of his personality." Id. at 534.
87. Cour de Cassation, 1991. For a thorough history of this case, see Paul Edward Geller,
French High Court Remands Huston Colonization Case, 39 J. COPYRIOHT SOC'Y 252 (1992).
88. Among Huston's great films are: Treasure of Sierra Madre, Maltese Falcon, and
Chinatown.
89. Technology permits a computer to scan a black and white film for shades of gray and then
apply an appropriate color. See James T. Duggan & Neil V. Pennella, The Case for Copyrights in
"Colorized" Versions of Public Domain Feature Films. 34 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 333 (1987).
Provided the colorized version indicates authorship, the colorized film could be granted copyright
registration as a derivative work. 37 C.F.R. § 202 (1987). "Colorization" is a registered trademark
of Colorization, Inc. See Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Nov.
3, 1987, at TM 3.
Colorization, which has been compared to 'painting a mustache on the Mona Lisa," see
Jennifer T. Olson, Note, Rights in Fine Art Photography: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 TEx. L. REV.
1489, 1514 & nn.150-51 (1992), is a subject of tremendous controversy in this country. Woody
Allen and other filmmakers have testified frequently in Congress that colorization interferes with
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Huston's black and white film, Asphalt Jungle. Although in the United States,
colorized films are subject only to the most minimal of constraints,90 the
French trial court enjoined the broadcast of Huston's film. The Cour d'appel
reversed. It noted that although French law permits such relief, American law
would not recognize Huston's (who was not the copyright owner) moral right.
The Cour d'appel did, however, require the television station to state Huston's
objections and to remind the audience that they could tune their television sets
to blot out the color. The next appeal, to the Cour de Cassation, was
successful. This court reversed the intermediate appellate court and stated that
moral rights inure to the benefit of an author, even a foreign one.9
The Whistler, 2 Shostakovich," Buffet, 9 and Huston" cases illustrate
the significant moral rights protections afforded artists under French law and are
typical of the moral rights approach in those countries which have a much longer
history of "droit moral" than does the United States. The following sections
discuss why moral rights may have bloomed so late in our country. The state
their right of integrity. Legal Issues that Arise When Color is Added to Films Originally Produced,
Sold and Distributed in Black and White: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Technology and
the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Ses. 62 (1987). However, the
congressional response has been relatively meager. The National Film Preservation Act of 1988 and
1992 are a very small sop to Woody Allen, et al. See infra note 90.
The colorization debate is a lively one. See, e.g., Craig A. Wagner, Note, Motion Picture
Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628 (1989); Daniel
McRendree Sessa, Note, Moral Rights Protections in the Colorization of Black and White Motion
Pictures: A Black and White Issue, 16 HoFsTRA L. REV. 503 (1988); Lawrence Adam Beyer,
Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy of
Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1011 (1988); Alberta L. Cook, Colorization; Actors and
Directors: Color Them Mad as Hell, NAT'L L.J., July 27, 1987, at 10, 11; Roger L. Mayer et al.,
Colorization: The Arguments For, J. ARTs MGMT. & L., Fall 1987, at 64; Woody Allen et al.,
Coorizadion: The Arguments Against, J. ARTS MGMr. & L., Fall 1987, at 79.
90. See National Film Preservation Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 179-179K(Supp. IV 1992) and supra note
89. The National Film Preservation Act of 1988, 2 U.S.C. § 178 (1988) (repealed 1992), permitted
a panel to include up to 25 movies per year in a national registry of classic films. See generally
David A. Honicky, Film Labelling as a Cure for Colorization [and other Alterations]: A Band-Aid
for a Hatchet Job, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 409 (1994); Warren H. Husband, Resurrecting
Hollywood's Golden Age: Balancing the Rights of Film Owners, Artistic Authors and Consumers,
13 CoLuM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 327 (1993). The authors agree that currently there is inadequate
protection for authors of altered films. One solution is proposed in The Film Disclosure Act of
1993, H.R. Doe. No. 1731, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), which amends The Lanham Act, adding
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), under which networks or any distributor must comport with certain
requirements should they wish to show a materially altered film.
91. See Jeffrey L. Graubart, U.S. Moral Rights: Fact or Fiction?, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 7, 1992,
at 5, 7.
92. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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of moral rights protection that existed in this country prior and subsequent to
VARA will then be described.
B. Moral Rights in the United States
There are several answers to the question of why the moral rights doctrine
has taken so long to gain a foothold in this country. One theory is that United
States copyright law, such as tort,9 property, 97 or contract' law, is very
much the child of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence with its emphasis on economic
property rights. Recall that our very first copyright statute 9 was modeled on
its English progenitor, the Statute of Anne."° Thus, the American notion of
copyright as protective of economic property rights, rather than personal rights,
was borne directly from its earlier English counterpart.' 0
Aside from the geneological explanation for tardy moral rights acceptance
in this country, the history and geography of art may also be a factor. ' 2 In
terms of the history of western art, the art "capitol" of the western civilized
world over the centuries has moved westward - from the classical period in
Athens, the neo-classical in Rome, medieval and gothic art in various continental
European cities, the high Renaissance in Florence, and late nineteenth century
impressionism in Paris. It is only in the twentieth century that New York has
become a major art center; the Armory Show of 1913 brought together
approximately 1600 seminal modern works of art and was considered by some
to be the "most significant art show in American history."1 3 This is not to
suggest that, prior to 1913, America had not seen its share of important visual
artists; James Whistler,t °4 Thomas Eakins, Mary Cassatt, and Winslow Homer
were but a few. But it is only quite recently that American visual artists have
achieved international renown and that the American public has paid the kind of
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Strict liability for abnormally dangerous
activities finds its origins in such cases as Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 Ex. 265, affid, L.R. 3 H.L. 300
(1868). See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176 (7th
Cir. 1990).
97. The feudal English doctrine, the "Rule in Shelly's Case," 1 Coke, 93 b (1581) was for
many years in this country part of the common law of real property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1234 (5th ed. 1979).
98. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. Ch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Excheq. 1854),
which is very much alive and well. See, e.g., Rardin v. T&D Machine Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d
24, 26-27 (7th Cir. 1989) (Judge Posner applying Illinois law).
99. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 stat. 124 (Copyright Act of 1790).
100. 8 Anne 1 ch. 19 (1710). See supra text accompanying note 38.
101. See Kwall, supra note 9, at 17 n.67.
102. See Merryman, supra note 10, at 1042.
103. See supra note 5.
104. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the French moral rights case
involving Whistler.
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attention and homage to art heretofore found in the art centers of Europe. In thelast sixty years, such American artists as Robert Rauschenberg,tre Jim Dine,Jasper Johns,"°6 Robert Indiana, Roy Lichtenstein, Andy Warhol, LarryRivers, Georgia O'Keefe, Edward Hopper, and Alexander Calder have
established our country as a major art center, and major art movements, such
as the "Ash Can School" and "Pop Art," were developed and flourished within
our borders.'" But the relative youth of our country and its art, some
commentators believe, may explain why moral rights protection in this countrylagged so far behind the international art communities.'" The artist as hero,icon, celebrity, and media event is, in this country, a recent phenomenon.Contrast this situation with the story of the intense competition for, and greatpublic attention in the fifteenth century to, the design of the bronze Baptistrydoors at the Piazza del Duomo in Florence. Ghiberti beat out fellow artists
Brunelleschi, Donatello, and Jacopo della Quercia."°9 The intense rivalry,
machinations worthy of Machiavelli, and public attention to the competition!"
were not atypical of the role of artists in Renaissance and post-Renaissance
society. American art, in a chronological sense, has just entered this milieu.Chicagoans will not burn down the city over a painting-"Paris maybe, but
105. Rauschenberg parodied Mona Lisa. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
106. Johns also parodied Mona Lisa. Id.107. See JANSON, supra note 4, at 675. George Bellows represents the Ash Can School'semphasis on realistic, gritty scenes. STRICKLAND & BoswELL, supra note 2, at 154-55. RoyLichtenstein and Andy Warhol ("the Pope of Pop") were Pop Artists who depersonalized art andused consumer items as "art." Id. at 174-75. As such, they may represent the artistic progeny of
Duchamp.
108. Merryman, supra note 10, at 1042; Roeder, supra note 10, at 557. Even internationally,the notion of art as reflection of an artist's personality did not achieve recognition until the age ofpositivism and Freud. Albert Elsen, WMy Do We Care About Art? 27 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 954(1976). Elsen, an art historian, explained:
[Trhe concept of self-expression is historically recent in art, originating in the last
century, when pioneering modernists such as the Impressionists took it upon themselvesto work from personal experience in individually acquired styles rather than byinterpreting the experience of others in academically approved modes. With thedevelopment of abstract art early in this century, artists looked for art's sources in the
self. They radically changed the conditions of art in order to capture the uniquequalities of their private vision, and this change resulted in the creation of the very
vocabulary and grammar of their art. Painters such as Kandinsky could look upon their
art as creations and as intimate extensions of themselves. Picasso saw his art as a diary.
... By extension, the modem artist's work, grounded in the self, becomes a tangible
manifestation of his personality. In view of their country's early leadership in modem
art, it is not surprising that by the mid-19th century French jurists began to recognize
and protect this intimate relationship between the artist and the work of art.
Id. at 954-55.
109. Italy 95 (Michelin 1992).
110. See GIORO VASAI, THE Livs OF THE ARTISTS 86-87, 116-17 (1550) (Bondella trans.Oxford U. Press 1991). Vasari's book is a wonderful source of information about Italy'squattrocento and cinquecento artists. Vasari himself was an artist of some repute.
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Americans have never taken culture that seriously." 11
The delayed birth of moral rights in this country, as opposed to the
continental European experience, may also be due to the strong values we attach
to free expression as embodied in the First Amendment. Those civil law
countries where moral rights have received their greatest reception, such as
France, Germany, and Italy, have no explicit speech protection analogous to that
of our 200-year experience with an amendment which is thought to be at the top
of the hierarchy of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Because the
moral right of integrity directly affects expression, for example, a parody which
may injure an artist's honor or reputation, First Amendment concerns may lurk
behind our slow acceptance of moral rights. While traditional copyright law
also affects expression, relying on fair use to effect the proper balance, it does
not protect "honor and reputation" per se but rather the pecuniary rights of
artists. In contrast, "honor and reputation" issues have heretofore been
subsumed in defamation law with its concomitant constitutional constraints.
Interestingly, there has been a case where an artist was sued for libel based on
a painting, Mugging of the Muse. The defendant and plaintiffs were friends but
the friendship dissolved over artistic disputes. The plaintiffs claimed that the
allegorical painting defamed them and were successful in the trial court when the
case went to the jury. The New York appellate court reversed and dismissed
the case with costs (one bill). The court concluded that although libel could,
arguably, be committed by a painting, "there was no proof of injury to the
plaintiffs... [other than perhaps] extreme embarrassment ... but that is not
cognizable injury.""' But if libel were shown, it would be tested under
constitutional standards of malice or reckless disregard." 3
1. Moral Rights in the United States Before VARA
Prior to our adherence to Berne" 4 and subsequent enactment of explicit
but limited federal moral rights protection for certain visual arts under section
111. Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) In May 1988, three
Chicago aldermen removed a painting of Harold Washington dressed in women's frilly white lingerie
from the School of The Art Institute. The student painter filed a civil rights suit which was settled
for $95,000. See Matt O'Connor, Suit Ended on Picture of Washington, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21,
1994, § 2, at 1.
112. Silberman v. Georges, 456 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
113. Id. Moreover, the painting could properly be viewed as critical opinion, rather than a
defamatory statement of fact and would be constitutionally protected. See generally Laura Cohen,
Beyond Silberman v. Georges: Shielding the Artist From Claims of Libel, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTs.
L. REV. 235 (1986); Leslie Kim Treiger, Note, Protecting Satire Against Libel Claims: A New
Reading of the Firs Amendment's Opinion Privilege, 98 YALE L.J. 1215 (1989).
114. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, July 24, 1971
(Paris).
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106A," 5 there were differing views as to the extent of quasi-moral rights
protection under copyright or other state or federal doctrines. While many
commentators have thought that the personal rights of artists received insufficient
protection prior to VARA,11 6 at least one observer found that as of 1986,
United States law did offer several meaningful equivalents to moral rights
protection."" However, most of the controversies that arose between artists
and defendants resulted in judicial decisions that strained to apply doctrine ill-
fitting to the moral rights issues raised in those cases.
a. State Law and Moral Rights
In one of the earliest cases directly raising a moral rights claim,
Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,"' a New York court
rejected Shostakovich's argument that use of his music in an anti-Soviet movie
violated his moral rights as it falsely imputed to him disloyalty to his
country." 9 The court reasoned:
There is no charge of distortionof the compositions nor any claim
that they have not been faithfully reproduced. Conceivably, under the
doctrine of Moral Right the court could in a proper case, prevent the
use of a composition of work, in the public domain, in such a manner
as would be violative of the author's rights. The application of the
doctrine presents much difficulty however. With reference to that
which is in the public domain there arises a conflict between the moral
right and the well established rights of others to use such works. So,
too, there arises the question of the norm by which the use of such
work is to be tested to determine whether or not the author's moral
right as an author has been violated. Is the standard to be good taste,
artistic worth, political beliefs, moral concepts or what is it to be? In
the present state of our law the very existence of the right is not clear,
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
116. See Kwall, supra note 9, at 18 & n.68.
117. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA i. L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986). See also Sam Ricketson, U.S.
Accession to Berne: An Outsider's Appreciation (part 2), 8 INTELLECTUAL PROP. J. 87, 103-04
(1993) (quoting Letter from Dr. Arpad Bogsch, Director General, World Intellectual Property
Organization to Irwin Karp, Esq., June 16, 1987).
118. 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1948). See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text
for a more extended discussion of the French case. Other cases denying the validity of moral rights
claims include Vargas v. Esquire, 166 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1947) (holding that the defendant need not
attribute authorship), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 813 (1948); Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89
N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949) (finding that the defendant could obliterate the plaintiff's
fresco).
119. Shosuakovich, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
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the relative position of the rights thereunder with reference to the
rights of others is not defined nor has the nature of the proper remedy
been determined."o
Still other plaintiffs have sought to cast their moral rights claims in other
legal clothes, such as contract, not necessarily with any 
more success.
12 1
Other state doctrines relied upon by plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their moral
rights include invasion of privacy,l"  defamation,n and unfair
competition.'12 However, the lack of a uniform approach and the
unpredictability of results in these moral rights cases make state law protection
problematic. Further, lurking behind any of these state law claims is the
possibility of preemption under one or more federal laws, especially the
Copyright Act."
120. Id. at 578-79 (citations omitted).
121. See, e.g., Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979)
(holding that the plaintiff's moral right claim was subsumed in his contract right to seek remedy for
mutilation of his article and must be dismissed). But see, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588
(2d Cir. 1952) (finding that the defendant breached a contract by selling abbreviated records made
from the plaintiff's master discs; the contract required appropriate attribution of authorship); Zim
v. Western Publ. Co., 573 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1978) (publishing a revised version of plaintiff's
book violates agreement between author and publisher); Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 202 N.Y.S.
164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) (stating that false attribution and unauthorized use of author's name
constitutes breach of contract).
122. Zim v. Western Pub. Co., 573 F.2d 1318, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978); Geisel v. Poynter Prods.,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 339 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
123. Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
124. Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures,
Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331,
354 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988) provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression ...
whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are
governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right
or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
Id.
Even without the specific preemption language of section 301, state law moral rights claims
could be preempted if 1) Congress has occupied the field in such manner as to foreclose state law,
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), or 2) state law conflicts with the objectives of a
federal statute, Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Div. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
Intellectual property plaintiffs usually are well aware of the preemption problem, but
nevertheless may try to bring claims in state courts for a variety of reasons. See generally Ted D.
Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or
Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 703 (1988). Plaintiffs may prefer state courts because of
different jury pools, decreased litigation costs, greater familiarity with state court, less crowded
dockets and other reasons.
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As a response, perhaps, to this murky state of moral rights protection, a
number of states have enacted artist and author rights statutes in the last decade
or so. The House Report on VARA noted that as of 1990, eleven states had
such statutes: 2  California,' 27  Connecticut,"H Illinois,29 Louisiana,' 30
The Supreme Court has considered the intellectual property/preemption issue in several cases.See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (stating that the state plug
molding statute was preempted by the Patent Act); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470(1974) (holding that the state trade secret law was not preempted by the Patent Act); Goldstein v.California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that the state anti-piracy statute protecting sound records(then not protected under federal copyright law) was not preempted); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234(1964) (holding that the state unfair competition law was preempted by the Patent and CopyrightActs). See generally Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers andCompulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1977) for adiscussion of preemption under § 301 of the 1976 Act; I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 1.01
for a discussion of preemption under the 1909 Act.
126. H. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,6919.Three other states protect artists' rights. Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.720 to .760(Michie 1994); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-22-16 (1992); and Utah, UTAH CODEANN. § 9-6-409 (1992). Nevada law grants the rights of attribution and integrity. NEV. REV. STAT.ANN. § 597.730, 597.740 (Michie 1994). South Dakota grants the rights of attribution and integrityto an artist whose work has been acquired by the state. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 1 1-22-16(1)
to 1-22-16(3) (1992). Utah grants to artists who create art work commissioned by its ArtsDevelopment Program the right of attribution and integrity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-6-409(2), 9-6-
409(5) (1992).
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994). The California Art Preservation Actis intended to prevent a person who acquires "fine art" from physically altering or destroying that
art. The statute prohibits "any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of a work
of fine art" by anyone other than the artist who owns and possesses the work. Id. § 987(c)(1). The
same prohibitions apply to a person who mutilates, alters, or destroys a work of fine art through
gross negligence. Id. § 987(c)(2).
The aim of the statute is two-fold: (1) to uphold the artist's reputation, since fine art is "an
expression of the artist's personality" thereby triggering the artist's interest in protecting the work;
and (2) to promote the "public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations."
Id. § 9 87(a).
The statute provides several remedies for the artist who is injured by a violation of this
section. These remedies include: injunctive relief, actual and punitive damages, attorney and expert
witness fees, and any other relief the court finds proper. If a court awards punitive damages, they
will be given to a California organization(s) that is dedicated to fine arts. Id. § 987(e)(1-5).
The act contains a statute of limitations under which actions must be brought within the longerperiod of three years after the time of the injury or one year after discovery of the injury. Id. §987(h)(4)(i). The statute applies to artists and their heirs, personal representatives, or devisees untilthe 50th anniversary of the artist's death. Id. § 987(g). The effective date of the statute is January1, 1980, and the statute applies to injurious acts occurring on or after that date, regardless of when
the work of art was created. Id. § 987().
California courts have held that architectural plans are not covered by the Act, see Robert H.Jacobs, Inc. v. Westoaks Realtors, Inc., 205 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), but that apainted mural is. See Botello v. Shell Oil Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 535, 540 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For
a general discussion of the Act, see G.L. Francione, The California An Preservation Act andFederal Preemption by the 1976 Copyright Act- Equivalence and Actual Conflict, 18 CAL. W. L.
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Maine,' 3 1  Massachusetts, 32  New Jersey, 13 3  New Mexico," New
REv. 189 (1982); John G. Petrovich, Artists' Srautory "Droit Moral" in California: A Crisical
Appraisal, 15 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 29 (1981).
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-116s to 116t (West 1992). The statute protects artists
from intentional physical defacement or alteration of their fine art by another person. Id. § 42-
116t(a). The artist is given the right to violate these provisions if she owns and possesses the work
of art that he or she created. Id. The statute applies to works of art created on or after October 1,
1988. Id. § 42-116t(g).
The statute provides remedies identical to the California Act, see supra note 127, except that
the Connecticut provision does not allow for punitive damages. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t
(West 1992).
The Connecticut statute includes a limitations period,requiring an artist to bring an action
within the longer period of three years after the violation or one year after the artist's discovery of
the violation. No action, however, can be maintained more than ten years from the date of injury.
Id. § 42-116t(f). The statute applies to artists and their heirs, personal representatives, or devisees
until the 50th anniversary of the artist's death. Id. § 42-116t(d).
129. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 815, para. 320/1 - 320/8 (West 1993).
The illinois statute does not address explicitly an artist's moral right to ensure the unaltered
maintenance of a piece of art. However, the statute does hold an art dealer liable for the "loss of
or damage to" a work of fine art while in the dealer's possession. Id. para. 320/2 § 2(5). The
statute indicates that an artist's transfer of fine art to an art dealer constitutes a consignment,
rendering the art dealer an agent of the artist and the art "trust property" and making the art dealer
"trustee for the benefit of the artist until the work of fine art is sold to a bona fide purchaser or is
returned to the artist." Id. para. 320/2, § 2(1)-(4).
The statute also prohibits an art dealer who accepts fine art on consignment from using or
displaying the art or a photograph of the art unless notice is given to persons who use or view the
art that the product is the artist's creation. Id. pars. 320/5, § 5(2). A violation of this section
subjects an art dealer to damages of $50 and any actual damages, including incidental and
consequential damages, as well as reasonable attorneys' fees. Id. para. 320/7, § 7.
130. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2151 to 2156 (West 1987). The Louisiana statute, entitled
the Artists' Authorship Rights Act, prohibits a person other than the artist or person acting with the
artist's consent from displaying, making accessible to the public, or publishing:
(1) A work of fine art of an artist in an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified
form.
(2) A reproduction of a work of fine art of an artist if the work is depicted as,
or the reproduction is, in an altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified form.
(3) Work, if it is in its original or reproduced form and is displayed, made
accessible to the public, or published as being the work of the artist, when the work is
known to be generally regarded by the public as that of the artist, or under
circumstances in which it would be reasonably regarded as being the work of the artist,
and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to result therefrom.
Id. § 51:2153.
Moreover, a person who defaces, mutilates, alters, or modifies a work of fine ad as a result
of gross negligence is liable under this Act. Id. § 51:2155(A). The Act is inapplicable to works
prepared under contracts for advertising or trade usage unless the contractual arrangement provides
for its application. Id. § 51:2155(D).
A violation of this section provides the artist with a cause of action for legal and injunctive
relief. Id. § 51:2156(A). A suit under this act must be brought within three years after the violation
or within one year after actual or constructive discovery of the violation. Id. § 51:2156(B).
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131. ME. Rtv. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988). This statute provides that no person
other than an artist or person authorized by an artist may bowingly display in a place accessible to
the public or publish fine art or a reproduction of fine art that is in an "altered, defaced, mutilated
or modified form" if: (1) the work is represented as the work of the artist or could reasonably be
regarded as his or her work; and (2) the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to be damaged as a
result of displaying, reproducing, or publishing the art. Id. § 303(2). In addition, if conservation
work on a piece of fine art is grossly negligent, the statute will apply. Id. § 303(4).
A violation of this statute enables an artist or the artist's personal representative to bring an
action for legal and injunctive relief (in the form of the artist's disclaiming authorship of the piece).
Id. § 303(5). Maine's statute contains a limitations period allowing suits within the longer period
of three years after the injurious act occurs or one year after the injurious act is discovered or
reasonably should be discovered. Id. § 303(5).
132. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1994). The law's purpose is to
prevent the 'physical alteration or destruction of fine art" in order to prevent harm to the artist's
reputation. Further, the public has an interest in "preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic
creations." Id. § 85S(a). This statute prohibits anyone other than the artist who owns and possesses
the art, or a person authorized by the artist, from intentionally defacing, mutilating, altering, or
destroying fine art. Intent includes gross negligence, as well as deliberate action. Id. § 85S(c).
If the statute is violated, the artist "or any bona fide union or other artists' organization
authorized in writing by the artist" may bring an action in superior court without any initial showing
of damages. The recovery can include injunctive or declaratory relief, actual damages, reasonable
attorneys' and expert witness fees, other costs, and other court-ordered relief. Id. § 85S(e).
The statute applies to the artist or, upon his or her death, to the artist's heir, devisee, or
personal representative until the 50th anniversary of his or her death. Further, if the artist is dead,
the state attorney may act on behalf of the deceased artist and bring suit for injunctive relief if the
work of art is in the "public view." Id. § 85S(g).
The limitations period within which an action must be commenced under § 85S is two years
after the injurious event occurs or one year after the discovery of the act, whichever is later. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 2C (West 1992).
For a general overview of the Massachusetts Act, see Vance R. Koven, Observations on the
Massachusetts An Preservation Act, 71 MASS. L. Rav. 101 (1986).
133. N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to 24A-8 (West 1987). The Artists' Rights Act,
recognizes that the physical nature of fine art "is of enduring and crucial importance to the artist and
the artist's reputation" and that the alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification of fine art
could affect this. Id. § 2A:24A-2. Consequently, the statute recognizes that destruction of the
integrity of the art causes a loss to the artist and the artist's reputation. The statute permits an artist
to object to these actions when certain circumstances occur. Id. § 2A:24A-2(a)-(d). The statute
prohibits anyone other than the artist (or person authorized by the artist) from knowingly displaying
in a public place fine art that is 'altered, defaced, mutilated or modified" if the artist's reputation
is reasonably likely to be damaged. Id. § 2A:24A-4. Moreover, the statute also prohibits anyone
other than the artist (or person authorized by the artist) from knowingly displaying in a public place
fine art that is "altered, defaced, mutilated or modified" if the artist's reputation is reasonably likely
to be damaged and if the fine art is 'published or reproduced as being the work of the artist by use
of the artist's name in conjunction with the reproduction or publication.' Id.
Gross negligence in allowing the work to be adversely affected over time will also subject the
holder of fine art to liability under this section. Id. § 2A:24A-6. The act is inapplicable to works
prepared under contract for advertising or trade use unless contractually prescribed. Id. § 2A:24A-
7. The remedy under this act is legal and injunctive relief. Id. § 2A:24A-8(a). Any action under
this statute must be brought within the later time of six years after the violation or two years after
the constructive discovery of the violation. Id. § 2A:24A-8(b).
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York,'35 Pennsylvania,"3  and Rhode Island.'37  The protections afforded
134. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to 13-4B-3 (Michie 1978). The Fine Art in Public
Buildings Act protects an artist's right of integrity, id. § 13-4B-3A, and attribution, id. § 13-4B-3B,
provided the work is "fine art . . . of recognized quality." Id. § 13-4B-2B. Relief may include
injunctions, actual damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and other costs. Id. § 13-4B-3C. The
rights endure for the life of the artist plus 50 years, id. § 13-4B-3E, and can only be waived by a
written instrument. Id.
135. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (MeKinney Supp. 1994). This statute protects
the authorship rights of artists. The statute prohibits anyone other than the artist or a person duly
authorized by the artist from knowingly displaying in a place accessible to the public or from
publishing "a work of fine art or limited edition multiple of not more than three hundred copies by
that artist or a reproduction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form." Id. §
14.03(1). This prohibition will apply if the work is claimed, or could reasonably be regarded, as
being the artist's work and if the artist's reputation is reasonably likely to be damaged by the
injurious act. Id.
Gross negligence in maintaining or protecting fine art will trigger a violation of this statute.
Id. § 14.03(3)(a). This statute is inapplicable to art composed under an advertising contract or used
in trade unless provided for contractually. Id. § 14.03(d). To remedy a violation of the statute, an
artist can sue for legal and injunctive relief. Id. § 14.03(4)(a). Any suit brought under the statute
must fall within the longer of a three year period after the time of the injurious event, or one year
after the violation has been discovered through constructive discovery. Id. § 14.03(4)(b)..
Artists have tried to avail themselves of the Act's protections without much success. See, e.g.,
Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107, 1114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
the defendant's placement of the plaintiff's sculpture with an anti-nuclear message in a pro-nuclear
context was not a mutilation or alteration under the Act); Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc., 697 F. Supp.
748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff's claim under the New York Act was
preempted by the Copyright Act as it "tracks the rights protected by the Copyright Act").
For a general discussion of the New York Act, see Edward J. Damich, The New York Artists'
Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1733 (1984); Sarah A. Smith,
Note, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and Enhanced Staus for
Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 158 (1984).
136. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (1993). The "Fine Arts Preservation Act"
prohibits a person other than an artist who owns and possesses a work he or she created from
committing or authorizing, in an intentional manner, "any physical defacement, mutilation, alteration
or destruction" of fine art. Id. § 2104(a). The statute applies only to fine art that is displayed in
Pennsylvania in a place of public access. Id. § 2110(a). This act also applies to a person who acts
with gross negligence while framing, conserving or restoring a work of fine art. Id. § 2104(b).
The following remedies are provided for an artist aggrieved by a violation of the statute:
injunctive relief, actual damages, reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, and other relief the
court deems proper. Also, punitive damages may be awarded, but these damages shall be given by
the court to a charitable or educational organization(s) that focuses on the fine arts in Pennsylvania.
Id. § 2105(3).
The rights under the act extend to a living artist or to the heir, legatee, or personal
representative of an artist until the end of the 50th anniversary of the artist's death. Id. § 2107(1).
This statute is inapplicable to art composed under an advertising contract or for commercial use
unless provided for contractually. Id. § 2107(3). This statute applies to works existing in, or
created after, 1986. Id. § 2110(6). An action may be maintained under this statute only within the
later time of three years after the violation or one year after its discovery. Id. § 2109.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/8
1995] THE "DISSING" OF DA VINCI 961
to artists' moral rights vary greatly among these statutes. New York is probably
the most protective of an artist's personal rights," 8 while the California act
seems to stress the preservation of art with no provision for affronts to an
artist's reputation. 1' The laws of Connecticut," Massachusetts,141
Pennsylvania," 2 and Rhode Island'" are of the California model, while
Louisiana,'" Maine,' 0 and New Jersey" focus, like New York, 147 on
the artist's reputation. Though the House Report lists Illinois, the Illinois statute
really does not encompass any moral rights protections, other than a de minimis
right of attribution.'" These varying laws have been described by an artists'
rights attorney as a "patchwork of rules which by itself vitiates somewhat the
single, unified system of copyright." 4' However, Congress said that certain
statutes, like those discussed above, were sufficient safeguards of paternity and
integrity rights such that Article 6'" of Berne" could be satisfied:
This existing U.S. law includes various provisions of the
Copyright Act and Lanham Act, various state statutes, and common
law principles such as libel, defamation, misrepresentation, and unfair
competition, which have been applied by courts to redress authors'
invocation of the right to claim authorship or the right to object to
distortion.'5 '
137. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-62-2 to 62-6 (1987). The law prohibits anyone other than the artist
or person authorized by the artist from knowingly and publicly displaying fine art, or from
publishing a reproduction of fine art, in an "altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form," if the
work is represented as that of the artist or if the work would reasonably be considered as being that
of the artist. Id. § 5-62-3.
Gross negligence in maintaining or protecting art will also trigger the application of this
statute. Id. § 5-62-5. The statute is inapplicable to advertising or trade use, subject to contract,
unless contained in the contract. Id. § 5-62-5(d). Relief can be legal or injunctive. Id. § 5-62-6(a).
The statute contains a limitations period of the longer of three years after the violation, or one year
after discovery of the violation. Id. § 5-62-6(b).
138. See supra note 135.
139. See supra note 127.
140. See supra note 128.
141. See supra note 132.
142. See supra note 136.
143. See supra note 137.
144. See supra note 130.
145. See supra note 131.
146. See supra note 133.
147. See supra note 135.
148. ILL. COMP]LED STAT. ANN. ch. 815, para. 320/5, § 5(2) (West 1993).
149. H.R. REP. NO. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Seas. 6915, 6919 (1990) (testimony of JohnKoegel).
150. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Property, Article 6", Paris,
July 24, 1971.
151. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. 9-10, reprinedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3714-15(emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No. 609, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. 38 (1988); H.R. REP. No.
609, 100th Cong., 2d Seas. 32-40 (1988).
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Even before VARA, however, there was always the possibility of
preemption of state statutes of the type described.'
52 Provided the state statute
at issue and federal copyright law protect common subject matter and grant
equivalent rights, the state statute will be explicitly preempted.'
53 Further,
implied preemption might occur, even if the state laws were not "equivalent"
under section 301, if the state statute frustrated the objectives of federal
copyright law." Post VARA, the preemption of these state moral rights
statutes is even more complicated, but perhaps more likely to occur.
55 The
preemption problem does not, of course, occur when moral rights protections
are afforded under federal, as opposed to state, law.
1
'
b. Pre-VARA Protection of Moral Rights Under Federal Law
Prior to VARA, federal copyright law offered only minimal and indirect
protection of the personal rights of artists. Professor Kwall noted the possibility
that sections 115(a)(2), 106(2), 203, 304, and 501(b) of the Copyright Act might
be read to protect an artist's moral rights, but to date this has not been the
case.' 57 The legislative history of section 115(a)(2) 5 , indicates Congress'
intent "to recognize the practical need for a limited privilege to make
arrangements of music being used under a compulsory license, but without
152. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (stating that the pre-VARA 1976 Copyright Act does not preempt the New York statute);
Tracy v. Skate Key, Inc. 697 F. Supp. 
7 4 8
,
7 5 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ronald Litoff, Ltd. v. American
Express Co., 621 F. Supp. 981, 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that when the right of reproduction
is involved, the New York statute is preempted). See also Brett Sirota, Note, The Visual Artists
Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 461 (1992); Francione, supra
note 127; Damich, supra note 135. For a detailed description of state moral rights law and
preemption problems, see Edward J. Damich, State "Moral Rights" Statutes: An Analysis and
Critique, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 291, 329-47 (1989).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
154. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
155. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, CoPYRIGHT 291-92 (Supp. 1993); Zuber, supra note 10, at 508.
VARA added a new explicit preemption section, 17 U.S.C. § 301(0, which preempts state common
or statutory law granting rights equivalent to section 106A. Any state claim filed prior to June 1,
1991, the effective date of VARA, is not preempted by section 301(0, nor are state moral rights
which extend beyond the life of the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(2)(A), (C) (Supp. V 1993).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1988) provides: "Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under any other Federal statute." Id.
157. Kwall, supra note 9, at 38-56.
158. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1982) provides:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical arrangement of
the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation
of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a derivative
work under this title, except with the express consent of the copyright owner.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [1995], Art. 8
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol29/iss2/8
1995] THE "DISSING" OF DA VINCI 963
allowing the music to be perverted, distorted, or travestied." 1' Section 106(2)
grants to the author the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work. " " This section might allow an author to sue someone
who substantially distorts the author's work.' The termination procedures
of sections 2036 and 304(c)" a could be interpreted to safeguard a creator's
personal rights.' Finally, section 501(b),'" permitting "beneficial" as well
as legal owners of a copyright to sue for infringement, indicates that even an
artist who has given or sold all copyright interests might be able to sue for
violation of his or her exclusive right under section 106(2) to make a derivative
work.e To date, however, federal copyright law, as it existed before the
enactment of VARA, was a negligible, 67 if not non-existent, source of moral
rights safeguards.
Another federal statute, the Lanham Act, specifically its unfair competition
provision," furnished the basis for the high water mark of federal moral
rights protection pre-VARA. In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,'69
the Monty Python group (Python) sued to enjoin ABC from broadcasting two
ninety-minute specials of Monty Python programs. _ ABC cut, without Python's
permission, twenty-four minutes out of each of the ninety-minute programs.
ABC edited the material to make time for commercial advertising and to
eliminate "offensive or obscene matter."" T Python argued, and both the trial
159. Kwall, supra note 9, at 39 & n.149 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas.
109, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5724).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
161. Kwall, supra note 9, at 40-41, 47-48. See also National Geographic Soc'y v. Classified
Geographic, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 655, 659-60 (D. Mass. 1939) (stating that cutting up, rearranging,
and rebinding articles from the plaintiff's magazine and then selling the "new" books violates the
1909 Act).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
163. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (1988).
164. Kwall, supra note 9, at 56.
165. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988).
166. Kwall, supra note 9, at 49. In Part HI.B.2 of her article, Professor Kwall discusses
various provisions in the copyright act which circumscribe moral rights. Id. at 57-72.
167. But see Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (interpreting
the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970) (repealed 1976), to grant plaintiff relief).
See discussion of Gilliam, infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976) provided in part:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods
or services ... a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation
... and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable
to a civil action by any person. . . who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged
by the use of any such false description or representation.
Id.
169. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
170. Id. at 18. Such words as "hell" and "damn" were deleted. Id. at 23.
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and appellate courts agreed, that broadcasting of the Python shows in the
truncated ABC version violated the integrity of Python's work and could make
Python subject to criticism-the very stuff of section 1125(a) protection.'
For instance, ABC distorted one of the skits thusly:
[Aln upper class English family is engaged in a discussion of the
tonal quality of certain words as "woody" or "tinny." The father soon
begins to suggest certain words with sexual connotations as either
"woody" or "tinny," whereupon the mother fetches a bucket of water
and pours it over his head. The skit continues from this point. The
ABC edit eliminates this middle sequence so that the father is
comfortably dressed at one moment and, in the next moment, is shown
in a soaked condition without any explanation for the change in his
appearance. i
Section 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, as interpreted creatively by Gilliarf
and other courts17 4 (not without criticism however), 17 indicates the lengths
to which some courts will go to protect an artist's moral rights even absent
explicit federal law. Unlike the patchwork of state moral rights, section 1125(a)
could provide national uniformity. However, most commentators and a few
courts believe the fit between Lanham and droit moral is an extremely tenuous
one. 176
2. Moral Rights Under VARA
. Despite state moral rights statutes,'" state law doctrines such as contract,
unfair competition, defamation, and privacy,"~ and strained reliance on
171. GiUiam, 538 F.2d at 24. The court also held that ABC violated the 1909 Copyright Act.
Id. at 19.
172. Id. at 25 n.12.
173. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 124 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1110 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the
Lanham Act provides a remedy to the plaintiff in a "sound-alike" suit because of "an economic
interest akin to that of a trademark holder in controlling the commercial exploitation of his or her
identity"); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the substitution of the
plaintiff's name constitutes "reverse passing off" and is actionable under § 1125).
175. Halicki v. United Artists Communication, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding
that a false description of the plaintiff's film as an "R" rated movie was not actionable under §
1125).
176. See, e.g., Halicki, 812 F.2d at 1213; Gi/iam, 538 F.2d at 26-27 (Gurfein, J., concurring);
Kwall, supra note 9, at 24 & n.8 9. But see Diana Elzey Pinover, The Rights of Authors, Artists and
Performers under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 38 (1993).
177. See supra notes 126-51 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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Copyright and Lanham Act provisions," it was not until July 1, 1991, the
effective date of VARA,' that copyright law explicitly protected the moral
rights of attribution and integrity. Thus, VARA creates the potential for a
nationwide, uniform scheme, albeit limited, of moral rights safeguards.
Whether Congress enacted VARA to comport with Berne moral rights
requirements"" or as a supremely political compromise between the arguments
tendered by folks in both camps of the colorization debate," is not made clear
by VARA's legislative history. George C. Smith, chief minority counsel for the
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law, describes the birth
of VARA thusly:
On the last day of the 101st Congress, a major bill was passed
authorizing 85 new federal judgeships. To placate senators in a
position to block the bill, sponsors were forced to include several
unrelated measures. The judgeships legislation became a "Christmas
Tree"-a vehicle for enactment of bills that could not have passed as
free-standing legislation.
One of the baubles on this tree was a seemingly innocuous
provision known as the Visual Artists Rights Act. [Senator] Edward
Kennedy, D-Mass., had been promoting the law for years, and it had
finally been passed by the House of Representatives. But the bill had
not been cleared by the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it faced
opposition from some Republican members.
The bill was ultimately passed by the full Senate only because of
its linkage to the critical judgeships legislation. The few Republican
senators opposed were not about to block the creation of 85 judgeships
merely to prevent passage of a measure that seemingly affects a
narrow range of interests. Without so much as a word of debate or
discussion, the artists act became law.
The lack of debate is unfortunate because the new statute
179. See supra notes 157-76 and accompanying text.
180. Pub. L. 101-650, Tit. VI, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990), (codified at 17 U.S.C. 106A (Supp. V
1993)).
181. Recall that Congress had, perhaps disengenuously, stated that protection of moral rightsin this country was sufficient to admit us into Berne. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51.Adherence to Berne was desired to curb international piracy and to make the U.S. an effectiveparticipant in international copyright. See Carl H. Settlemyer Ifi, Between Thought and Possession:Artists' "Moral Rights" and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 GEo. L.I. 2291, 2307n.71 (1993).182. See supra note 89. The narrow range of works protected by VARA was not unintentional.See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993). Compare 136 Cong. Rec. H 3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990)(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("We will continue to consider whether claims arising in the film
context meet the same standards as visual artists' claims did.") with id. at 3115 (statement of Rep.Fish) ("[Tihis legislation should not be viewed as a precedent for the extension of so-called moral
rights into other areas.").
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constitutes one of the most extraordinary realignments of private
property rights ever adopted by Congress-albeit in a very specialized
context. The act grants artists a continuing right to restrict the use and
disposition of artistic works that they have sold to private citizens."
To highlight the coverage now afforded by VARA and the unresolved
copyright issues created by the addition of these moral rights to what previously
was a pecuniary-based protection scheme, let us now return to our imaginary
case of Leonardo v. Duchamp to see whether VARA offers any redress when
Duchamp purchases a single copy of Leonardo's Mona Lisa edition of 100 and
draws a moustache upon those famous smiling lips. Initially, Leonardo will
need to show that the Mona Lisa edition is a "work of visual art" protected by
VARA. Since the Mona Lisa lithographs are in a limited edition, under 200
copies, and are signed and numbered by Leonardo, he could satisfy the
definitional requirements of section 101(1).18 However, not only must the
protected work be a work of visual art, but the offending work must also be a
work of visual art." Duchamp's L.H. 0.0. Q. is such a work. Because the
hypothetical assumes that Leonardo created the Mona Lisa after June 1, 1991,
and that he is still alive today, the rights afforded by section 106A are in full
force"' and are independent of any of the exclusive rights provided in section
106.' We will also assume that Leonardo has not waived any 106A rights;
waiver must be evident in a written instrument signed by Leonardo which
specifically identifies the Mona Lisa lithograph edition."
Leonardo's main claim under VARA is that Duchamp, in adding a
moustache to one of Leonardo's lithographs, intentionally distorted, mutilated,
or modified the work in a way "prejudicial to his ... honor or reputation."8
In short, Duchamp violated Leonardo's right of integrity. Leonardo might also
183. George C. Smith, Let the Buyer of An Beware; Artists' Moral Rights Trunp Owners'
Property Rights Under the Visual Artists Rights Act, REcoRDER, Jan. 10, 1991, at 4.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. V 1993). Note that, if we had not massaged the facts, Leonardo's
portrait could be considered owned by Signore Giocando as a work for hire, 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988), and, thus, not a "work of visual art" protected by VARA. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) (Supp.
V. 1993).
185. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)3) (Supp. V 1993).
186. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (Supp. V 1993).
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Although an artist can waive her moral
rights, the waiver is not transferable. Id. § 106A(e)(2). Several possibilities stem from these
provisions. First, even if Leonardo had sold all of his 106 rights, his 106A rights remain throughout
his life. Second, even if he had sold his 106 rights and waived his 106A rights to that same person,
an action could still be maintained against a third party under 106A because waiver of moral rights
is not transferable.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
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assert that Duchamp violated his right of attribution;'9 that, except for the
moustache, the rest of the lithograph was authored by him, not Duchamp.
However, for purposes of this Article, the right of integrity claim will be
emphasized.
To succeed on his integrity claim, Leonardo will not have much difficulty
showing that Duchamp intentionally distorted, mutilated, or modified his Mona
Lisa. Duchamp clearly knew what he was doing and intended at least to
"modify" the work to accomplish the desired result. Duchamp relates the
history of his creation:
In 1919 1 was back in Paris and the Dada Movement had just made its
first appearance there: Tristan Tzara who had arrived from
Switzerland, where the movement had started in 1916, joined the
group around Andrd Breton in Paris. Picabia and I had already shown
in America our sympathy for the Dadas.
This Mona Lisa with a moustache and a goatee is a combination
readymade and iconoclastic Dadaism. The original, I mean the
original readymade is a cheap chromo 8 x 5 on which I inscribed at
the bottom four [sic] letters which pronounced like initials in French,
made a very risqu6 joke on the Gioconda.'
A more sticky issue arises as to whether Duchamp's parodic modification
"would be prejudicial to [Leonardo's] honor or reputation. "" The fuzziness
of the phrase "prejudicial ... to honor or reputation" is not made appreciably
clearer by VARA's legislative history. The House Report on VARA tells the
courts to focus on "the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the
individual as embodied in the work that is protected .... While no per se rule
exists, modification of a work of recognized stature will generally establish harm
to honor or reputation."' But the House Report emphasizes that the standard
of harm "is not analogous to that of a defamation case, where the general
character of the plaintiff is at issue."' Based on this amorphous standard-
harm to artistic honor or reputation-it is not very clear what Leonardo would
have to show: that art galleries no longer give him single artist shows, that the
price of the other Mona Lisas in the lithograph series have plummeted, that the
190. Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A).
191. MARCEL DucHAMp, MARCEL DuciAwp 289 n.131 (Anne D'Harnocourt & Kynaston
McShine eds., 1973). The artist made a second, larger version of L.H.O.O.Q. in 1930. Id.
192. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
193. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1990), reprnted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6925-26.
194. Id. at 15.
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New York Times art critic now views this series as banal and an object of
derision, that he can no longer get "commissions"'ra to do portraits, that he
has been asked to resign from the Valparaiso, Indiana, Post-Renaissance Artists
Society, or that no gallery will accept any of his work, either on consignment
or as part of a sale? Most commentators agree that this subjective standard may
raise insurmountable practical and evidentiary issues, 9 ' although expert
testimony can be sought to show whether the modification does indeed affect the
honor or reputation of the artist."'7
Assuming that Leonardo can show the requisite harm, the only barrier to
recovery under the panoply of remedies of the Copyright Act'9 would be the
fair use doctrine. '" As a parodist,' Duchamp would attempt to raise this
defense. The following sections will discuss the nature of parody and fair use
(Part III) and the proper resolution of Leonardo's claim against Duchamp (Part
IV).
195. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, N.Y. ARTS AND CULT. AFF. LAW §
14.03, 14.03.1 (McKinney Supp. 1993), see supra note 135, provides a marginally more concrete
standard: recovery is appropriate if damage to the author's reputation is reasonably likely to result
from defendant's alteration, defacement, mutilation, or modification.
196. See Jill R. Applebaum, Note, 7he Visual Arsts Rights Act of 1990: An Analysis Based
on the French Droit Moral, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191, 213-14 & nn.157, 169 (1992); see
also Note, Visual Artists' Rights in a Digital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1986-87 & n.65
(1994).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6925-26.
198. These include injunctions, impounding, damages and profits or statutory damages, costs,
and reasonable attorneys' fees. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-505 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section 501
explicitly states that these remedies are available to authors whose 106A(a) rights are violated. See
17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1993). Note that, even if Leonardo's actual damages are slight or
difficult to quantify, he may alternatively elect to seek statutory damages under § 504(c). Recently
doubled under the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 102 Stat.
2853, 2860, the sums range from a minimum of $500 to a maximum of $20,000; from $50,000 to
$100,000 for willful infringements; and $200 for innocent infringements. On the Duchamp facts
hypothesized here, Duchamp would probably be found to have infringed willfully. Willfulness could
be shown by reckless disregard of Leonardo's copyright, see Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton
Knitting Mills, 519 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), or by Duchamp's knowledge of infringement.
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Xanthas, Inc., 855 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1988). Cf. Supra text
accompanying supra note 191.
199. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. V 1993). See infra notes 229-322 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 229-322 and accompanying text.
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III. PARODY AND FAIR USE
Parody is "the tribute that mediocrity pays to genius."10'
"[Plarodies and caricatures are the most penetrating of criticisms."a
"'Larceny is the sincerest form iv flattery [sic]. '"
A. Parody in the Arts
Parody has been a recognized art form in western civilization,' as well
as in other societies,' for thousands of years. Apparently, even the great
Homer himself did not escape parody's sting, either in ancient or in more recent
times. "The rhapsodists who strolled from town to town to chant the poems of
Homer were immediately followed by another set of strollers-buffoons who
made the audiences merry by the burlesque turn which they gave to the solemn
strains"; for instance, by relating tales of frogs and mice doing battle as if
they were heroes of Homeric proportions.' Similarly, Hegemon of Thasos'
play, Gigantomachia, was a Homeric parody that turned an Athenian defeat in
the Syracuse expedition into a victorious tale of Athenian exploits. Some two
thousand years later, Shakespeare parodied several episodes of The //iad in
Troilus and Cressida." In the twentieth century, James Joyce used Homer's
Odyssey in a parodic fashion in Ulysses,2 " encapsulating the ten years of
Homeric adventure into a twenty-four hour day, June 16, 1904, with Leopold
201. Robert A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 31 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L.
SYM. 1, 12 (1984) (quoting Oscar Wilde).
202. Id. at 11-12 (quoting Aldous Huxley).
203. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY ON IVRYTHINO AND IVRYBODY 155 (1963).
204. Leon R. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv.
1130, 1133 (1955).
205. For example, Masami Teraoka's watercolor, New Views of M. Fuji: Sinking Pleasure
Boat, 1976-1977, is an ironic, modem version of an 1823 Japanese print. All the figures are
wearing traditional garments, but Teraoka's painting contains ideograms, placed near cameras and
golf clubs, which, translated from the Japanese, say "Golf Craze" and "Leave Wives Behind."
JEAN LIPMAN & RICHARD MARSHALL, ART ABOUT ART 94 (1978). A late 16th century Chinese
novel, THE PLUM IN THE GOLDEN VASE OR CHIN PING ME[ (Roy English trans., Princeton
University Press 1993), is another non-western example. Professor English notes that Chin Ping
Mei, "'[ike Joyce's Ulysses,.... weaves into its plot verbatim quotations from the entire Chinese
cultural spectrum-songs, jokes, popular literature, parodies of a variety of conventional styles.'"




209. GILBERTHIGHEr, THE ANATOMY OF SATIRE 109-10 (1962). Shakespeare's work, in turn,
became the object of parody: Hamlet was parodied by Tom Stoppard's play Rosencrantz and
Guildenstern Are Dead. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET: PRINCE OF DENMARK (1600); TOM
STOPPARD, ROSENCRATZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967).
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Bloom as a wandering Jew in Dublin representing the Greek hero2 '0 and Molly
Bloom, his wife, as Penelope.2" ' The widespread recognition of the
underlying Homeric work gives to all of these later parodies zest and life. The
second artist-writer, painter, composer, or political pundit-expects us to be
cognizant of the original work and forces us to deliberate about the changes
wrought by his or her parody. Is this a paradigmatic case where familiarity
breeds contempt or, perhaps, wit, humor, and a sly understanding of what is
going on and, thus, more art?
Parody can be found not only in literature, as the Homer parodic odyssey
described above illustrates,212 but also in politics, the visual arts, and music.
A few illustrative examples will suffice to indicate the breadth of parodic
uses-all of which, it must be recognized, have enriched and expanded those arts
which are the focus of copyright protection and which further copyright's goal:
"[tjo promote.. . useful Arts. "213
Political parody in our country dates at least as early as 1776. In that year,
the New York press published a parody of the Declaration of Independence,
barely after the penned signatures were dry.214 The parody used the actual
preamble of the Declaration but then targeted the Continental Congress, instead
of the royal government of Great Britain, with a list of abuses. Such icons of
musical Americana as "Yankee Doodle," "The Star Spangled Banner," and "My
Country 'Tis of Thee," started out as English ballads and were then made into
political song parodies.215 In the New Deal era of the 1930s, one author
parodied both President Franklin Roosevelt and Lewis Carroll's Alice in
Wonderland in his 1936 novel entitled Rosie in Squanderland, complete with
such Carroll characters as the Dormouse (who becomes the taxpayer), and the
White Rabbit who, in Squanderland,
can pull [the country] out of debt by spending more and more money.
No one else has ever been able to do that. But I can, because. . . it
210. HIGHEr, supra note 209, at 67-147.
211. The episodic arrangement of Joyce's Ulysses corresponds to the adventures of Ulysses in
Homer's Odyssey, such as Cyclops (ch. 12), Calypso (ch. 4), Sirens (ch. 11), and Circe (ch. 15).
Further, 1904 Dublin can be thought to stand-in for a Hellenic city-state. STUART GILBERT, JAMES
JOYCE'S ULYSSES: A STUDY 16, 30 (2d ed. 1952). See also FRANK DELANEY, JAMES JOYCE'S
ODYSSEY, A GUIDE TO THE DUBLIN OF ULys}s (1981); RICHARD ELLMANN, ULYSSES ON THE
LIFFEY (1972).
212. See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214. See BRUCE INOHAM GRANGER, POLITICAL SATIRE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1763-
1783, at 127-28 (1960).
215. See JOHN TASKER HOWARD, OUR AMERCAN Music: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY FROM
1620 TO THE PRESENr 37, 113-18, 121-28 (4th ed. 1965).
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is not my money. It belongs to the Dormice [taxpayer], and they are
just too damn dumb to understand what I am doing to them." 6
More recently, during the Gulf War, many disk jockeys at commercial
radio stations wrote and aired such parodies as "Hussein is Crazy" (to the tune
of "She Drives Me Crazy"), "Iraquity-Raq" (to "Yackety-Yak"), and "Iraqi
Blues" (to "Summertime Blues")." 7 The underlying works were all protected
by subsisting copyrights. Similarly, such groups as the Capitol Steps in
Washington, D.C., use parodies of copyrighted songs to target recent denizens
of the Beltway; for example, "Why not take Al and Me" (a jab at the Clintons
and Gores to the tune of "Why Not Take All of Me") and "Day Care" (a poke
at "Nannygate"-a/k/a the "Zoe" factor-the difficulties endured by President
Clinton's nominees for Attorney General, to the tune of the calypso classic,
"Day-O"). 1 5 On the other coast, the song "Walk Like an Egyptian" was used
to parody the political disputes between a former governor of California and
Rose Bird, former Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. The parody
was entitled "Walk Like a Deukmejian."" 9
In the musical arts sphere, parodies have been written to deflate the
pomposity of operas' and to spoof other compositions. Mozart, Wagner,
Bartok, Debussy, and Peter Schickele (a/k/a P.D.Q. Bach) have all employed
parody. For instance, in his Concerto for Orchestra, Bartok took on Dimitri
Shostakovich'snI Symphony No. 7 as follows: "trumpets give a Bronx cheer;
216. J. LEWIs STACKPOLE, ROSIE IN SQUANDERLAND5 (1936). The layers of parody are often
like archeological strata. Lewis Caroll's Alice in Wonderland itself often parodies Victorian verse
of the late 19th century. See MACDONALD, supra note 206, at 278.
217. See Brief for Petitioners, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994)
(No. 92-1292).
218. Brief for Amici Curiae Capitol Steps Prod., Inc. at app. A, pars. 3, Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
219. Id. at app. D, para. 3.
220. Donald J. Grout, Seventeenth Century Paradies of French Opera-Pan!1, 27 MusiCAL Q.
211,219 (1941). For more recent put-downs of operas, no one was more adept than Sid Caesar and
Imogene Cocoa, with the assistance of Carl Reiner and others, in several classic episodes of "Your
Show of Shows" in the early days of television.
221. Ironically, Shostakovichhad raised, unsuccessfully, one of the earliest moral rights claims
in our courts based upon a movie studio's use, with attribution, of parts of his music in the movie,
7he Iron Curtain. Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1948). Shostakovich's fear was that the anti-Soviet theme of the movie which used his
music would cast aspersions on his loyalty to the Soviet nation. The New York court squarely
rejected the composers moral rights claim and denied the "drastic relief" sought by Shostakovich.
Id. at 578. It should be pointed out that Shostakovich could not have maintained a copyright
infringement suit. Prior to May 27, 1973, when the Soviet Union acceded to the Universal
Copyright Convention, all works first published in that country before that date were considered in
the United States to be in the public domain. Interestingly, Shostakovich brought essentially the
same case to a French court. The French court granted Shostakovich relief, ordered the film seized,
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high strings and woodwinds shriek derision.. . woodwinds trail off in giggles;
trombones fart, glissando. The whole wind band combines trills with an um-pah
bass to introduce. . . violins in varied repetition of the Shostakovich tune. " '
2 Live Crew's alleged parody of Roy Orbison's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," is
a more recent example.'2 Let the listener decide which is sublime and which
is ridiculous.
The visual arts have also seen more than their fair share of parody. The
1919 Duchamp parody of Leonardo's 1506 Mona Lisa, which is the starting
place for this Article, is just one illustration. Others range from the ridiculous,
which include Mad Magazine's "Sports Titillated" parody of the swimsuit issue
of Sports Illustrated, to the sublime, such as Titian's Venus (1538) parodied by
Manet's Olympia (1893), and the putatively sublime, such as Andy Warhol's
1963 parody of the Mona Lisa entitled Thirty are Better than One, M*A*S*H's
1970 film containing a parody of Leonardo's The Last Supper (circa 1497), and
Larry Rivers' 1970 parody of Manet's Olympia entitled I Like Olympia in
Blackface. Warhol's parody, which reproduces identical images of the Mona
Lisa in rows six across and five down was intended to critique "a consumer
society that loves quantity more than quality and can use a popular icon of
highbrow art as a mass-produced product."' Several other prominent
twentieth century artists also have parodied the Mona Lisa: Charles Addams
(Monster Rally 89 (1950) (a cartoon of Mona Lisa sitting in a movie audience));
Robert Rauschenberg (Mona Lisa, 1958); Jasper Johns (Figure 7, 1969); Tom
Wesselman (Great American Nude #35, 1962); Philippe Halsman (Mona Dali,"
What Dali sees when he looks at Mona Lisa, 1954); Marisol (Mona Lisa, 196 1-
62); Robert Arneson (George [Washington] and Mona in the Baths of Coloma,
1976); Shusako Arakawa (Portrait of Mona Lisa, 1971); and Peter Max (Mona
Lisa, 1991).'
Thus, Duchamp's parody is well-grounded in a long and solid parodic
and declared that there was "undoubtedly a moral damage" caused by the use of Shostakovich's
music. Soc. Le Chant du Monde v. Soc. Fox Europe Cours d'appel, Paris, D. Jur. 16, 80 (Jan. 13,
1953).
222. William Austin, Bartdk's Concerto for Orchestra, 18 MUSIC REV. 21, 37 (1957).
223. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
224. LINDA HUTCHEON, A THEORY OF PARODY 47 (1985). As for American art, Grant
Woods' American Gothic must be one of the top ten targets for parody.
225. JEAN LIPMAN & RICHARD MARSHALL, ART ABOUT ART 28, 58-62 (1978). A recently
formed art group, the "Guerrilla Girls," produced a poster of Mona Lisa with a fig leaf covering
her mouth to protest censorship and sexism. CAROL STRICKLAND, THE ANNOTATED MONA LISA
194 (1992). As of 1952, there were more than five dozen versions of the Mona Lisa. Id. at 34.
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tradition.' While the hypothetical case of Leonardo v. Duchamp is based on
a chronological glitch with a moral rights twist, the "invasion" is much the same
as Duchamp's actual 1915 parody, which is an exact reproduction of the Mona
Lisa with several zingers. First, Duchamp painted a large black moustache and
small goatee-graffiti-on what is undoubtedly one of the most celebrated, if not
one of the most beautiful and serene, female faces in western art. Second,
Duchamp changed the title of the work to the initials L. H. 0. 0. Q., which serve
as a French acronym that translates into something along the lines of "She has
226. One art museum recently mounted a display recognizing the work of parodists. In June
1994, the museums at Stony Brook, New York, presented "Parodies of the American Masters:
Rediscovering the Society of American Fakirs, 1891-1914." The Fakirs were a group of art students
who painted outrageous parodies of such well known artists as George Bellows, Winslow Homer,
and John Singer Sargent.
It should be noted that copyright is not the only branch of intellectual property that involves
problems of parody. Trademark parodies are fairly common, and infringement is judged by a
"likelihood of confusion" test. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1) (1988). Representative trademark cases
alleging infringement by parody include Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Pubs., 28 F.3d 769 (8th
Cir. 1994) (concerning a "Michelob Oily" parody in the defendant's humor magazine, Snicker);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316 (4th Cir.) (concerning a "King of
Beaches" parody of "Bud" slogan, which was printed on a series ofT-shirts), cell. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 206 (1992); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding that printing "Satire" prominently on "Spy Notes" parody of Cliffs Notes was
unlikely to cause confusion); Jordache Enterprise, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th
Cir. 1987) (dealing with a "Lardashe" parody of Jordache jeans); Shieffelin & Co. v. The Jack Co.
of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that "Dom Popignon," a popcorn
product mark, infringes upon the "Dom Perignon" champagne trademark); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did
It" Enters., 799 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Il. 1992) (concerning the parody of Nike's "Just Do It"
slogan); General Elec. Co. v. Alumpa Coal Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 1036 (D. Mass. 1979) (concerning
a "Genital Electric" parody). See generally Tammi A. Gauthier, Note, Fun & Profit: When
Commercial Parodies Constitute Copyright or Trademark Infringement, 21 PEPw. L. REv. 165
(1993); Peter W. Smith, Note, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable Lanham
Act Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1525 (1991); Tyrone Tasker, Parody or Satire
as a Defense to Trademark Infringemeni, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 216 (1987).
When a parodist seeks trademark protection for his or her mark, the Lanham Act poses several
hurdles. Section 1052(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1988), provides that no mark can be registered if
it is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception with a previously registered mark. Section
1052(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1988), does not permit registration of marks that are "immoral,
deceptive, or scandalous" or which "disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute." See, e.g., In re Runsdorf, 171
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (TTAB 1971) (holding that "Booby Trap" as a mark for brassieres is not
registrable).
In stark contrast to trademark law, copyright law has no explicit content-based restriction for
protection and courts have rejected reading such a restriction into the Copyright Act. See, e.g.,
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980) (rejecting the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff's pornographic movie,
Behind the Green Door, is not copyrightable subject matter).
Yonover: The "Dissing" of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duch
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1995
974 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29
a hot ass. "I L. H. 0.0. Q. can be pronounced phonetically in English as the
single word "look," referring perhaps to the enigmatic countenance of La
Giocanda, or, in French phonetics, it can also stand for the phrase "elle a chaud
au cul," translated more daintily as "she has hot pants."m These visual and
aural puns are what gives Duchamp's parody its kick to its viewers and its sting
to Leonardo's moral rights as an artist.
B. Parody and Fair Use
Parody, by its very nature, smacks of irreverence. Whether it involves a
send-up of a work protected by traditional copyright law22 or one protected
additionally by the new moral rights provisions of state3 0 or federal law,231
a parody is almost always quasi-revolutionaryM2 in concept and rarely is it a
loving, respectful, or deferential use of the underlying work. One example of
this is, of course, Duchamp's hirsute and bawdy version of Leonardo's Mona
Lisa. Another recent literary example is Ronald Richard Roberts' Ditches of
Edison County,23 3 which mocks, not at all gently, the runaway bestseller and
tearjerker, Robert James Waller's The Bridges of Madison County, 234 with
characters named Pancetta (an Italian word for ham) (the original heroine is
Francesca) and Robert Concave (the original hero is Richard Kincaid). Thus,
given the essential, even if subtle, naughtiness of most parodies, it is highly
227. See H.W. JANSON, HISTORY OF ART 693 (3d ed. 1986). Duchamp later "undid" part of
the 1919 parody in 1965, when he signed an un-mustchioed reproduction of Leonardo's Mona Lisa
and called it, L.H.O.O.Q. Shaved. See LIPMAN & MARSHALL, supra note 225, at 57.
228. See LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL, JR., THE POSITION OF DUcHAMP'S "GLASS" IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF His ART 368 n.40 (1977). Such punning is hardly surprising from an artist who
made a self-portrait, entitled With My Tongue in My Cheek (1959). Duchamp's L.H.O.O.Q. was
the cover for the issue of the March 1920 Dadaist publication, entitled 391. CALVIN TOMKINS, THE
WORLD OF MARCEL DUCHAMP 1887, at 61 (1966).
229. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
230. See supra notes 126-51 and accompanying text.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. V 1993).
232. Parody as revolution is as recent as Chinese political discontent. People wore
"dissatisfaction T-shirts" which turned political p rty propaganda into parody. See ORVILLE
SCHELL, MANDATE OF HEAVEN 273-74 (1994).
233. RONALD RICHARD ROBERTS, THE DITCHES OF EDISON COUNTY (1993).
234. ROBERT JAMES WALLER, THE BRIDGES OF MADISON COUNTY (1992). It may even be
that Madison's author is parodying his own work in his latest runaway bestseller and tearjerker,
SLOW WALTZ AT CEDAR BEND (1993). Another current literary parody of a more ancient story is
JOHN UPDIKE, BRAZIL (1994), a rollicking, rich, bawdy South American tale based on the medieval
legendary characters, Tristan and Isolde, which legend Wagner fashioned into his eponymous opera.
In Updike's take on the legend, the English White Knight sent to fetch the Princess Isolde becomes
a black charmer from the favelas of Rio de Janiero and Isolde is a young privileged white suburban
maiden.
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unlikely that any author or author's estate"5 will voluntarily permit the
parodist to use the underlying work. This may be especially true when it is the
moral right of integrity, the protection of "honor and reputation,'" that is at
stake. If parody is intended to criticize or mock an author's work, then almost
inevitably an artist's "honor and reputation" is on the line.
In parody, imitation is most often not the sincerest form of flattery to which
numerous examples will attest, ranging from a masturbating Mickey Mouse237
to 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman."' As the Ninth Circuit noted in Fisher
v. Dees, "[t]he parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to
make possible a use that generally cannot be bought."' It cannot be bought
because the original artist fears not only a deleterious economic effect on his or
her work (a hit on the pocketbook-traditional copyright protection), but the
negative effect on his or her artistic sensibilities, reputation, and honor (a hit on
the psyche-moral rights protection). Indeed, the authors of a leading copyright
casebook note that a licensed parody is oxymoronic.' To obtain permission
235. The Copyright Act of 1976 affords protection against infringement for the author's life
plus 50 years. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (for works created after Jan. 1,
1978). For works that are the subject of'subsisting copyrights on January 1, 1978, see 17 U.S.C.
§ 304 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Federal moral rights expire with the author's death. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(d) (Supp. V 1993).
236. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Cf. WILIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, act
3, sc. 3:
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
Id.
237. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2.d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
238. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
239. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). See also Wendy
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982).
240. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 600 n.5 (4th
ed. 1993). Cf. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (stating that it is "unlikefly] that creators of
imaginative works will license critical review or lampoons of their own productions"); Richard H.
Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use? 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 69 (1992) ("The credibility of book
reviews . . . would be undermined if a reviewer needed the author's permission to quote from the
book."); Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: 7he Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L.
REV. 11, 67 ("[Tihe granting of a license . . . constitutes an official seal of approval, the modern
day equivalent of an imprimatur."). See also the front cover of Ronald Richard Roberts'
(psuedonym) The Ditches of Edison County, supra note 233, which has stamped upon it
"unauthorized ... a parody." It would be hard to imagine that Robert James Waller, the author
of The Bridges of'Madison County, would permit this second author to ridicule so barbedly his book.
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from an artist who may assert personal, moral rights would seem to be virtually
impossible. Further, we may well wonder how parody could function
effectively as commentary and/or critique if the authority to satirize, criticize,
ridicule, or jibe is given. Permission connotes approval-few parodists wish
that blessing, and few artists, whose moral right of integrity is at risk, would
wish that curse.
There have been, however, a few instances where the parodist has been
able to obtain a license from the copyright holder of the underlying work. For
example, the producers of Forbidden Broadway, a New York show that uses
recent Broadway hit songs as grist for parody's mill, purchased licenses to use
songs by composers such as Richard Rogers, Oscar Hammerstein, Irving Berlin,
Leonard Bernstein, Alan Jay Lerner, and Frederick Lowe. Humorous lyrics
were then added to these songs, for example, "Madonna's Brain" sung to the
tune of Lemer and Lowe's My Fair Lady classic, "The Rain in Spain.""'
Most of such licensed, so-called parodies have been kinder, gentler jabs-more
homage than sharp jibe-than the usual parodying work presents.' 2
Permitted parody is, for the most part, a non-starter. In an Amici Brief in
support of 2 Live Crew, William A. Strauss, a Vice-President and Director of
Capitol Steps Productions, Inc., explains why:
5. The Capitol Steps do not seek or obtain licenses from
copyright owners for two reasons. First, we have been advised by
counsel that our songs constitute a "fair use" of the copyrighted
material we use, and for which we give full, album-jacket credit to the
original authors and composers. See the album notes to our twelfth
and most recent album, "The Joy of Sax," submitted as Exhibit 3 to
this declaration. Second, we have found that, in the business of social
or political satire, obtaining permissions from song publishers is, for
all practical purposes, impossible.
6. On one occasion, the producers of a network television show,
against our advice, tried to get publisher permission to perform seven
of our songs. After much time and discussion, permission was denied
in six of the seven cases.
7. Asking permission for such uses is interpreted by music
publishers as seeking their endorsement of the political ideas contained
in our lyrics. Many copyrights are controlled by large corporations,
such as Sony or Walt Disney, which have ongoing issues and
241. Amici Curiae Brief of Composers and Songwriters Fred Ebb, John Kander, Alan Menken
Mike Stoller, and the Estates or Trusts of Irving Berlin, Leonard Bernstein, et.al, in support of
respondent at A-i, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (No. 99-1292).
242. The licensed parodies listed in the Amici's Brief seem rather tame. See id. at A-i, A-2.
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243. Amici Curiae Brief of Capitol Steps Prod., Inc., Mark Russell, et al., in support of
Petitioners at 3a-4a, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (No. 99-1292).
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relationships in Washington. These companies have no interest in
endorsing barbed political satire directed at Members of Congress, the
President, or even the federal judiciary. Nor do we wish to submit
our lyrics to them for censorship. On the other hand, if we do not
seek or obtain permission, then the ideas and lyrics of our
songs-good or bad-are solely ours. And prior to the issuance of the
Acuff-Rose decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, no one had
ever sued us for copyright infringement ....
9. Finally, the very nature of social and political satire makes it
impossible to obtain timely permission. The Capitol Steps perform
up-to-the-minute political satire based on current political events; the
process of asking for and receiving permission would make it
impossible for us to perform the kind of current repertoire which our
audiences have come to expect. . .. A3
Comedian/political satirist, Mark Russell, similarly notes:
6. I do not seek nor do I obtain license from copyright owners
for several reasons. First, I have been advised that my use of
copyrighted songs constitutes "fair use" of the copyrighted material.
Second, the very nature of social and political satire makes it
impossible to obtain timely permission. When, for instance, it's
known that the President has spent $200 on a haircut, it is not possible
to wait more than the few hours necessary to write and memorize "He
Looked Pretty" to the tune of "I Feel Pretty." When the video tape
of the Rodney King beating became known, it was not possible to wait
for more than the few hours necessary to write and memorize "On
The Streets of LA" to the tune of "On the Street Where You Live."
7. It is not possible to wait for permission because at 7 or 8 p.m.
on a Friday evening, there is no way to get in touch with someone
who might be able to get in touch with someone from whom
permission might be obtained; the story may not last more than one
day-in which case the exercise of getting permission would be moot;
and because audiences have come to expect comment in song on the
topic of the day from me. To wait for permission means to disappoint
an audience-something that I, as a professional performer would try
never to do. On the rare occasion when permission has been
requested it was denied. On one particular occasion, NBC made the
request of the Disney Studios that just the first notes of its copywritten
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song "Chim-Chimney" be used to start my song about Gary Hart's
trip to Bimini. I started my song "Bim-bimini."
8. Asking permission would also be interpreted by music pub-
lishers as a request for an endorsement of the political ideas contained
within the lyrics. Since the comments contained within a song are
mine, no endorsement is needed or wanted. In my nearly 40-year
career I have never been sued for copyright infringement; nor has any-
one ever claimed to be injured by what I have said or sung ... .24
Even in a non-parody context, voluntary licensing is often prohibitively
expensive. For instance, in the digital sampling' " context, "artists often ask
ridiculous prices for permission to sample their works, [with fees ranging] from
$500 to $50,000, and some albums have been delayed, and tracks removed,
when clearances proved either too expensive or were simply not
negotiable."' 6 The silencing effect of this is self-evident. Thus, to escape
liability for infringement that is an unauthorized use of the underlying work,
there are only two avenues open to parodists (and samplers): silence (not to use
the protected work) or reliance on the fair use defense. 7  When an artist's
moral rights of honor and reputation are at stake, the parodist may well decide
to self-censor, fearing that the current formulation of the fair use doctrine might
not provide sufficient immunization. Silence will not, of course, add to
society's storehouse of "useful arts" contemplated by the constitutional grant of
limited copyright monopoly.' "
1. Case Law Prior to 1994: Lower Court Decisions
Almost four decades of copyright cases in which parodists have been
charged with infringement2 " have not resulted in any consistent, predictable,
244. Id. at 12a-13a.
245. Technological advances permit musicians the use of "virtually any sound-live or
recorded, natural or synthetic-at a performer's finger tips... to reshape borrowed sound in new
contexts." Jon Pareles, Digital Technology Changing Music, N.Y. Tnm, Oct. 16, 1986, at C23.
246. A. Dean Johnson, Music Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in
Digital Sampling Ifrtingement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 135, 135-36 n.4 (1993) (citation
omitted).
247. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
248. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 provides in pertinent part that copyright protection be for
"limited Times."
249. Representative parody/fair use cases since the 1950s include in chronological order:
Loew's Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), afd sub nom., Benney v. Loew's Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (holding that the Jack Benny "Autolight" parody was not fair use),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (Douglas, J., recusing himself); Columbia
Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (holding that the parody "From Here
to Obscurity" was fair use); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding
that Mad magazine's satirical lyrics sung to 25 of composer Irving Berlin's songs was fair use); Walt
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and coherent application of the fair use doctrine, at least until the Supreme
Court's attempt in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. ' Obscenity may cut
against a defendant" l or not, 2 perhaps depending on the sexual practice
involved in the parody: sodomy (fair use);253 cunnilingus (unfair use);'
masturbation (unfair use); 255  general "horniness"' (unfair use);257
intercourse and fellatio (unfair use).' Neither the relative outrageousness of
the parody nor the cleverness of the newly titled song seem to be a reliable
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that bawdy counter-culture
depiction of Walt Disney's cartoon characters was not fair use); MGM, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta
Coop Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that re-enactment of Gone With the Wind
as a comedy was not fair use); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding
that "I Love Sodom," an eighteen-second "Saturday Night Live" skit was fair use), affid, 623 F.2d
252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that
the parodizing song "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C" was not fair use); Pillsbury Co. v.
Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that a depiction of the
Pillsbury characters engaging in sexual intercourse and fellatio, and the reproduction of the Pillsbury
baking song was not fair use); Warner Bros., Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
that the television show "The Greatest American Hero" did not infringe upon the plaintiff's
"Superman" character); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the parody song
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue" was fair use); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (holding that "Garbage Pail Kids" was not fair use);
New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertelsman Music Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding that an alleged parody of "Freddy Krueger,- a character from the movie A Nighimare on
Elm Street was not fair use); Tin Pan Apple, Inc., v. Miller Brewing Co., 737 F. Supp. 826
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a beer company's use of a sound-alike and look-alike rap group in
a commercial parody was not a viable fair use defense); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co.,
765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 111. 1991) (holding that a defendant's use of a plaintiff's mechanical rabbit
beating on a drum was presumed to be fair use); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992)
(holding that a derivative sculpture based on a photo of a man and a woman holding seven puppies
was not fair use); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
the "Pretty Woman" song parody by the Rap Group 2 Live Crew was not fair use), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1164 (1994) (reasoning that a commercial parody is not presumptively unfair).
It is not surprising that most of the parody cases emanate from the Ninth and Second Circuits,
in which Hollywood and New York are located, respectively.
250. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
251. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
252. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
253. Id. at 746.
254. MCA, 677 F.2d at 180.
255. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
256. William Safire devoted a recent column to this interesting word. See William Safire, On
Language; The Horny Dilemma, N.Y. TnMEs, Feb. 6, 1994, § 6, at 10.
257. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1164 (1994).
258. Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
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predictor of whether the use will be deemed a fair one. 2
9
Additionally, courts have expressed divergent views about fair use
depending upon the focus of the infringing parody. The Sixth Circuit held
recently in Acuff-Rose that a "fair" parody cannot be a general social
commentary but must target the plaintiff's specific protected work.' In
contrast, the Second Circuit in Elsmere squarely rejected the notion that the
challenged parody must poke fun at the original work, rather than using that
work as a means to facilitate a more general critique of society. 6 It should
be noted here that either of these interpretations of parody as fair use could
facilitate Duchamp's defense in a traditional, property-based copyright
infringement claim. His Mona Lisa seems to target generally the Renaissance
ideal of woman (the original "feminine mystique"), as well as to attack
specifically Leonardo's work as an artistic icon.
Perhaps the best illustration of the slippery nature of the parody/fair use
defense can be found in two of the earliest cases decided only several months
apart by the same California federal judge. In the "Autolight" case, Judge
James M. Carter had to decide whether Jack Benny's 1953 television program,
parodying the movie Gaslight, constituted fair use. Benny had earlier made a
parody of the movie in a 1945 radio program and a 1952 television program.
The third time, 1953, was Benny's third strike. Loew's sued. Judge Carter
concluded that Benny's use amounted to a "substantial taking" and that a parody
or burlesque taking should be "treated no differently from any other
appropriation."I
A short time later, Judge Carter considered whether NBC's twenty-minute
parody of From Here to Eternity constituted fair use. Struggling, albeit rather
unsuccessfully, to distinguish adequately Benny's pirated taking of Gaslight in
his "Autolight" parody from Sid Caesar's fair use in his "From Here to
Obscurity's" take-off on Columbia Pictures classic, From Here to Eternity,
Judge Carter drew a very shakey line between permissible and impermissible
takings. He found the NBC work to be a "new, original and different . . .
work," unlike Benny's, and, thus, a fair use. 63 It is very difficult to reconcile
259. Cf. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "When Sonny Sniffs Glue"
is a fair use parody of "When Sonny Gets Blue") with MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir.
1981) (holding that "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C" is not a fair use of "The Boogie
Woogie Champion of Company C").
260. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1436 n.8.
261. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.I (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
262. Loew's, Inc. v. CBS, 131 F. Supp. 165, 177 (S. D. Cal. 1955), affid sub nom., Benny
v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affid by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958) (Douglas, J., recusing himself).
263. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. NBC, 137 F. Supp. 348, 352 110 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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these two decisions issued by the same judge in the same year. This
indeterminacy and seeming lack of predictable results stems from the very nature
of the fair use defense which requires application of the fair use doctrine on a
"case-by-case" basis.2 '
Still other courts have articulated what has become to be known as the
"conjure up test." Recognizing that the very nature of parody requires that the
audience make the connection between the original work and the parodying
work, some courts concede that a parodist must necessarily use "a substantial
enough portion of the original [and fairly well-known ] work to evoke
recognition,"'s to make both a successful and fair parody. These courts
acknowledge, as they should, that the artistic genre itself requires significant use
of the protected work. The "joinder of reference and ridicule" is thus the
essence of parody.267
However, the line between a fair "conjuring up" and an impermissible,
substantial, pirated taking is often quite difficult to draw. This lack of a bright-
line test is hardly surprising. The classic definition of parody is "counter song,"
a song beside another.s Thus, for the parodying work to succeed at all it
must be sung, painted, written, sculpted, in short, expressed in such a way as
to be evocative of the underlying work. In other words, the second artist must,
to parody, always take from the first artist. On the other hand, if the second
work amounts to a substantial taking, that is, something considerably more than
evoking or conjuring up the original work, the parody/fair use defense generally
fails. The Fisher court described the fine-tuning necessary to separate piracy
from permissible parody:
The unavailability of viable alternatives is evident in the present
case. Like a speech, a song is difficult to parody effectively without
exact or near-exact copying. If the would-be parodist varies the music
or meter of the original substantially, it simply will not be
recognizable to the general audience. This "special need for
264. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170, 1172 (1994). Although the
fair use factors were not codified until 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976), the judicially crafted doctrine
of fair use employed virtually the same analysis. Thus, in the 1955 Jack Benny and Sid Caesar
cases, Judge Carter presumably used the same "case-by-case analysis" as the Court in Acuff-Rose.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
265. For a second work to function at all as parody, the audience must be familiar with the
underlying work. Recognition gives parody its punch. See infra text accompanying notes 266-67.
266. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).
267. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1173 (1994).
268. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1064 (College ed.
1957). It derives from the Greek, "paroidia," "pare" meaning beside, and "oide" meaning song.
See id.
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accuracy," provides some license for "closer" parody . . . . To be
sure, that license is not limitless: the parodist's desire to make the
best parody must be "balanced against the rights of the copyright
owner in his original expressions.'
As the above discussion indicates, when the Supreme Court decided Acuff-
Rose,7' it was writing on its own clean slate (its first written decision in a
parody/fair use case27 t), but on a national slate made very rough and murky
by inconsistent, confusing, and uneasily reconcilable lower court opinions of the
last four decades. 2' The following discussion will present a brief overview
of the Supreme Court's Acuff-Rose decision and its fair use antecedents, which
have addressed fair use in the traditional, property right mode of copyright
infringement. This overview should facilitate later analysis of the clash between
moral rights and parody and fair use.
2. Parody and Fair Use in the Supreme Court
Before engaging in a brief analysis of three Supreme Court cases that
addressed the fair use doctrine, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Inc.273 and its non-
parody ancestors, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios274 and Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,275 it might be helpful to present the fair
use continuum in chart form. 76 The chart considers the four permutations of
two variables, which also comprise one of four statutory factors in section
107:Y whether the use is transformative or merely replicative and whether
the use is for profit or not. At either extreme (I or IV) the chart presents fact
patterns which are presumably easiest to decide re: fair use vel non. In
Category I-type cases, fair use will inevitably be denied. In category IV-type
cases, defendants can make the strongest argument for fair use and should be
269. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 439 (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.
1978)).
270. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
271. The Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Loew's case, CBS v. Loew's Inc., 353 U.S.
946 (1957), but did not issue a written opinion as Loew's was affirmed by an equally divided Court.
See supra notes 249, 262; infra note 289.
272. This is one statement most commentators seem to agree upon, even if their views may
differ as to the proper resolution of the parody/fair use dilemma. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smart, Fair
Use Doctrine is No Use as it Stands, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 13, 1993, at 15. See also supra notes 249
and accompanying text.
273. 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
274. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
275. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
276. Other commentators have furnished precedents for this chart which tries to synthesize the
fair use doctrine. See, e.g., MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw 318, § 10.14
& n.130 (1989).
277. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
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successful. The closer, more difficult cases are those represented by Categories
II and III.
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278. 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
279. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (stating that photocopying by scientists at the National Institute of Health and
the National Medical Library is free from the "taint" of commercial gain and is fair use). Cf.
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that for-
profit copying by Texaco's scientists is not fair use).
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1. Dissent in Harper &
Row (news reporting
purpose and grist for
robust debate tip the fair
use balance in favor of
defendant)
2. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. 21 (commercial
parody may be a fair use;
"conjuring up" is necessary
to the art form)
281. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
282. Q. Folsom v, Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344-45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
283. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 604-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284. 114S. Ct. 1164(1994).
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Note that this chart does not include three other factors mentioned in section 107
which focus on the nature of the protected work, the quantity and quality of the
portion taken by defendant, and the effect on plaintiffs potential market for the
work.' Depending on the resolution of these other determinants of fair use,
the ultimate disposition of the cases in categories I through IV could be affected.
Although the judicially crafted doctrine of fair use has been available to
defendants at least since 18411 and codified in the 1976 Copyright 
Act2W
without any substantial change,' the Supreme Court did not address fair
use's until 1984 in Sony' and again a year later in Harper & Row.
Neither Sony nor Harper & Row involved parody. This past spring in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose,tm the Supreme Court expanded upon its earlier analyses of fair
use in its unanimous decision,' which considered the special problems posed
by the intersection of parody and fair use. In concluding that 2 Live Crew's use
of Ray Orbison's ballad, "Oh Pretty Woman," might be fair, the Court
alternatively relied upon and distinguished Sony and Harper & Row.
Sony presented an unusual set of facts. Sony Corp. manufacturers and sells
home video tape recorders.' Universal, as owner of several copyrighted
television programs, sued Sony, claiming that the taping of nationally broadcast
285. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(2), (3), (4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
286. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Justice Story
described the defense as an "intricate and embarrassing question... 1where it was notl easy to
arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases."
Id. at 344. But he then proceeded to do so: "[Wie must... look to the nature and objects of the
selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.' Id. at
348.
287. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
288. Congress intended, by statutory enactment, "'to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair
use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.'" Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114
S. Ct. 1164, 1170 (1994) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 66 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679-80; S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 62 (1975)).
289. Because of Justice Douglas' recusal and a 4-4 split, the Court issued no opinion in CBS,
Inc., v. Loew's Inc. 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (Jack Benny/'Gaslight" case). Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975), raised fair use but was also affuimed by an equally divided
vote.
290. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
291. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The
Supreme Court also discussed fair use in Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236-38 (1990), but the
treatment was relatively brief and unremarkable for purposes of this article.
292. 114S. Ct. 1164(1994).
293. Justice Kennedy concurred to stress that while he agreed substantially with the Court's fair
use analysis, he believed it could still be possible for the District Court on remand to find that 2
Live Crew's song was not fair use. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1182 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294. The very machines that have caused incredible angst to entire generations and to those
precious few among them, excluding this author, who know how to fix "the flashing twelve."
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television programs by home viewers made Sony a contributory infringer.2
In deciding that taping for "time shifting" purposes constituted fair use,' the
Court engaged in a typical multifactor fair use analysis that regarded the doctrine
as an "'equitable rule of reason'. "' Although the Court concluded that the
Betamax recorder was "capable of substantial noninfringing uses," and would
not affect in a more than de minimis way the potential market for Universal's
copyrights,' the decision contained language which impacted significantly
upon the Sixth Circuit's 2-1 decision in Acuff-Rose which found 2 Live Crew's
alleged parody to be an unfair use.' The Sony majority stated that "use for
a commercial or profit-making purpose... [is]... presumptively... unfair,"
while the contrary presumption, non-commercial use is presumptively fair,
benefited Sony.' This latter presumption seemed to convince the Court of
the fairness of the use even though the activity at issue, taping, was merely
reproductive."'t
The presumption of unfairness attached to commercial use was reiterated
the very next year by the majority in Harper & Row,' even in the context of
news reporting which involves transformative and productive work and fits into
the category of the kinds of activities subject to fair use.m In Harper & Row,
defendant Nation magazine had "scooped" parts of former President Ford's
295. Universal did not sue any individual home taper. Although the Copyright Act does not
contain explicitly a provision making someone (i.e., the manufacturer and seller) liable for
infringement committed by another (i.e., the home taper), the Court adopted the notion of
contributory infringement from the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1988). This borrowing was
"appropriate," said the Court, because of "the historic kinship between patent law and copyright
law." Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19 (1984).
296. If the taping public did not infringe, then Sony, of course, would not be liable as a
contributory infringer.
297. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. at 448 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659).
298. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456. Qr The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1988) which provides:
Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer.
299. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
1164 (1994).
300. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 499 (1984).
301. Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, stressed the notion that fair use should generally not
apply when the use is reproductive, rather than productive, although he would not suggest "that
every productive use is a fair use." Sony, 464 U.S. at 479 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
302. 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) ("'[E]very commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the
copyright.'") (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451)
303. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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memoirs which were to appear, by agreement, in Time magazine. The Court,
stressing strongly the right of first publication and the fact that Nation took the
heart of Ford's memoirs about Ford's pardon of Nixon, found Nation's
infringement not excused as a fair use.'
Neither Harper & Row nor Sony involved parody. Taken together,
however, it would appear that, prior to Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court meant
what it said: if an alleged infringer uses the copyrighted work for commercial
purposes, then its use is presumptively unfair, even if the use results in a
transformative, productive, or creative work like the news reporting in Harper
& Row. Since fair use is an affirmative defense, 3W a commercial-use
defendant would thus be hard-pressed to overcome that presumption. Acuff-Rose
reined in the presumption, at least with regard to parody.
Despite the language in Sony, Justice Souter, writing for the unanimous
Court in Acuff-Rose, said that Sony "called for no hard evidentiary
presumption."' Thus when the Sixth Circuit elevated this one sentence to
a "per se rule," it was both "counter to Sony itself [and] . . . to the common-
law tradition of fair use adjudication."' Rather, the commercial nature of
the use is but one factor, to be added onto the scales with the other, non-
exclusive section 107 inquiries.'
What triggered the Court's apparent softening of what seemed to be
inexplicably clear language in Sony, also reiterated by Harper & Row? First,
Justice Souter noted the transformative nature of 2 Live Crew's song and, as a
transformative work, the song furthered copyright's goal "to promote science
and the arts."" Second, Justice Souter appreciated "parody's need for the
recognizable sight or sound" 3"'-the conjure up test."' Finally, in assessing
the effect of 2 Live Crew's use upon the potential market for the copyrighted
song, Justice Souter emphasized that, in the case of parody, even a commercial
one, it is likely that the second work "will not affect the market for the original
in a way cognizable"312 by the fair use doctrine."' This is so because there
304. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568-69.
305. The affirmative nature of the defense has been stressed since Justice Story's decision in
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). See generally PATRY, supra
note 14, at 22, 477-78.
306. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1171.
310. Id. at 1176.
311. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
312. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994).
313. cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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is "no protectable derivative market for criticism." 31 4  Since it is not likely
that creators will authorize the slings and arrows of criticism, the "potential
licensing market" for such is simply not present. 3 5 While there might be,
however, a derivative market for non-parody rap music, the record was silent
on that issue, which would need to be explored upon remand. 316
Acuff-Rose, although based on "traditional" copyright infringement(property rights), teaches several lessons that are important in resolving the
Leonardo v. Duchamp case based on a moral rights violation. First, Acuff-Rose
indicates that there are no fixed presumptions with regard to the commercial
character of use, at least in the parody situation. Rather, the for-profit character
of the use is to be regarded as one ingredient in the fair use recipe. Second,
transformative uses, as are both Duchamp's and 2 Live Crew's, furnish the very
stuff of copyright's goal,3"7 and "the more transformative the new work, the
less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may
weigh against a finding of fair use." 311 Third, the Court gave its seal of
approval to the "conjure up" test, articulated heretofore by a few lower
courts,31 9 which recognizes the special needs of parody as an art form:Mimesis is the sine qua non of parody. Moreover, the nature of parody as
criticism requires a sensitive inquiry into the potential market effect. 3W It is
one thing to reduce the potential market by disparagement and criticism. This
is not the negative market effect contemplated by section 107. It is quite another
to reduce demand by the substitution effect of the parodying work. In short, adefendant can destroy a plaintiff's market, but cannot replace it. This would
violate section 107(4), and, thus, it likely would not constitute fair use.
Therefore, we are left then with no bright-line test in traditional copyright
infringement cases. Each case must be analyzed on its own and all section 107factors are to be considered together.32 In eschewing any hard and fast
application of the fair use doctrine, the Court sacrificed, of course, a certain
314. 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
315. Id. at 1178 (quoting SOMERSET MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 241 (Penguin ed.
1992): "People ask ... for criticism, but they only want praise.").
316. Id. at 1178-79.
317. The Acuff-Rose Court cited Judge Leval's position on fair use several times as well asJustice Blackmun's dissent in Sony. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1170-71, 1178 (1994) (citing Pierre Leval Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105(1990)); Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (citing Blackmun, I., dissent in Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478-80 (1984)).
318. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994).319. Id. at 1176 (citing Elamere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253
n.1 (2d Cir. 1980); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986)).
320. SeeAcuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177.
321. See id. at 1170 (citing Leval, supra note 317, at 1110-11; Patry & Perlmutter, supra note
14, at 685-87).
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degree of predictability and uniformity. But this sacrifice, presumably at the
altar of copyright's purpose to foster creativity, 322 may complicate the
application of the fair use defense raised in conjunction with a moral rights
claim.
So, while Acuff-Rose dealt with traditional, property rights-based copyright
infringement, its lessons in the moral rights context have great import for us,
even though this author rejects an Acuff-Rose type solution to the very different
problem of a moral rights violation based on parody.
IV. RESOLVING THE MORAL RIGHTS/PARODY DIL.EMMA
THROUGH FAIR USE
In Acuff-Rose, a non-moral rights case, the Supreme Court specifically and
even-handedly rejected two proferred and contrary presumptions. The first
proposal, from defendants 2 Live Crew, was to treat parody as a presumptively
fair use. 323 The second, put forth by Acuff-Rose and adopted by the Sixth
Circuit, 3' was to view commercial use as presumptively unfair use, even in
the context of parody. 31 While neither presumption succeeded in Acuff-Rose,
this Section will argue that, in the moral rights setting involving parody, a
parodist's use should be presumed fair. Other means of resolving the tension
between an artist who claims moral rights and a parodist will also be explored
and, ultimately, rejected. The discussion takes place in the context of
contrasting positions. On the one hand, section 106(A)(a) makes explicit that
the right of integrity is subject to section 107's fair use defense.32' On the
other hand, Congress has expressed ambivalence about the viability of the fair
use defense in the moral rights arena:
[It is not clear that fair use claims will be] appropriate given the
limited number of works covered by the Act, and given that the
modification of a single copy or limited edition of a work of visual art
has different implications for the fair use doctrine than does an act
322. Id. at 1170 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). This emphasis on
"creativity" is also found in Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In
Feist, Justice O'Connor, for the Court, in order to assess the copyrightability of telephone white
pages, mentioned originality and authorship numerous times. Professor Goldstein says that
O'Connor referred to originality 13 times. GoLDSrMN, supra note 155, § 2.2.1 n.II (Supp. 1993).
323. See Campbellv. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1168 (1994).
324. 972 F.2d 1429, 1435, 1437 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit 'ostensibly [and
erroneously] culled" this presumption from Sony. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1173-74 (citing Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
325. See Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1168-69.
326. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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involving a work reproduced in potentially unlimited copies.12
Given this somewhat schizophrenic situation with respect to fair use in the moral
rights context, it might be wise to consider solutions, other than giving a
presumption of fair use to the moral rights/parodist defendant, which might
balance effectively the rights of the artist and parodist.
A. Compulsory License
The relationship between artist and critic can be described as one of worthy
adversaries, supportive and empathetic friendship, symbiosis at its finest, or the
art world equivalent of a dysfunctional family-a "can't live with 'em/can't live
without 'em" conundrum. Although artists may "ask. . . for criticism," even
if implicitly so, by putting their creations out for public consumption, "they only
want praise."" Parody is a form of criticism, and it is rarely kind, gentle,
or affectionate,3 or sought by the artist. In fact, I suspect that if all the art,
theatre, dance, and book critics, as well as parodists, would vanish from this
world this afternoon, artists world-wide would be dry-eyed. Thus, when moral
rights are at risk, "honor or reputation," copyright monopoly might be used to
prevent or chill the critic/parodist.
The concern that copyright owners could use their copyright (including
moral rights) to censor parody might be alleviated by establishing a "Parody
Licensing Clearance Center." The Center would be authorized by Congress to
provide a license on a percentage of revenue basis to anyone who chooses to
parodize the copyrighted work.3' Compulsory licenses function as
"permission to use intellectual property, compelled by the government to
accomplish some political or social objective." 33  Presumably, in the moral
rights context, a compulsory license would afford some monetary incentive to
Leonardo without endangering Duchamp any more than by requiring him to pay
a royalty.
327. H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Seas. 22 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6932. The stark contrast between explicit statutory language and legislative history may be
explained by VARA's somewhat hasty passage in Congress. See Smith, supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
328. MAUGHAM, supra note 315, at 241, quoted in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114
S. Ct. 1164, 1178 (1994).
329. See supra notes 234, 240-42, 244 and accompanying text.
330. See EDMUND W. KTCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEoAL RBGULATION OF THE
CoMPErrIvE PRocESS 212-13 (rev. 4th ed. 1993). The authors' suggestion did not address the
section 106(A)(a) parody problem, but it works equally well or equally ineffectively in the moral
rights context.
331. J.T. MCCARTHY, McCARTHY's DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLBCTuALPROPERTy 51-52
(1991).
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Compulsory licensing is a rarity in copyright law, but not a stranger. At
one time or another, the 1976 Copyright Act listed six areas covered by
compulsory license: cable television transmissions;332 making and distributing
phonorecords; 3.. jukebox recording or performing of musical
compositions;3 non-commercial (public) broadcasting;33 satellite retrans-
missions;' and importation and manufacture of digital audio recording
devices.337 It has even been suggested by the then Register of Copyrights that
the political compromise between the "protected interests of creators" and the
"pressures. . . of newly emergent user industries" might result in more, rather
than less use of compulsory license.3' In one sense, this is true. In
reviewing the then new 1976 Act, Professor Paul Goldstein listed the four areas
subject to compulsory license: cable transmission, phonorecords, jukeboxes,
and public broadcasting.339 Since 1977, two new areas were added: satellite
retransmission and digital audio recording devices.' ° On the other hand,
Congress recently endorsed private, voluntary licensing negotiations and
arbitration with reference to government fiat as a last resort.Y1
Compulsory license for parody seems a strange animal when used in either
the economic or moral rights context, but seems particularly inappropriate to the
right of integrity. Under VARA, moral rights cannot be sold or assigned, but
they can be waived in writing. Compulsory license works best, or at least
seems most necessary, when new technology presents issues of copyright
infringement not even dreamed of when the 1909 or 1976 copyright laws were
enacted. Thus, such uses as satellite transmissions and digital recording devices
seem amenable to compulsory license-parody does not. This point is illustrated
by the 1976 Act compulsory license scheme for making and distributing phono
records. A compulsory license is not available to someone who changes the
protected work. Section 1 15(a)(2) provides:
332. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c), (d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
333. Id. § 115 (1988).
334. Id. § 116 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Currently, section 116 problems are handled by a
negotiated license which may include arbitration, Id. § 116(b),(c) (1994).
335. Id. § 118 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (determining the royalty fee either by negotiated license
or compulsory license, see Id. § 1 18(b)(2)).
336. Id. § 119(b) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). After December 31, 1992, the royalty fee is
determined by voluntary negotiation or compulsory arbitration. Id. § 119(c)(1) (1988).
337. Id. §§ 1003, 1004 (Supp. V 1993).
338. Paul Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1128 n.83 (1977) (citing
Barbara Ringer, Copyright and the Future of Authorship, 101 LIB. J. 229, 231 (1976)).
339. Goldstein, supra note 338, at 1127-35.
340. 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). See generally Michael L. Baroni, A Pirate's
Palette: The Dilemmas of Digital Sound Sampling and a Proposed Compulsory License Solution,
11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 65 (1993).
341. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); supra notes 334-35.
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A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the
arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as aderivative work ... except with the express consent of the copyright
owner. 3
42
Similarly, a compulsory license should not be available to a parodist whoinfringes upon an artist's moral right of integrity by some fundamental
change-which parody always makes-to the protected work. It is not aquestion of accomodating emerging technology by political compromise.3
The compulsory license scheme ill-fits the balancing of interests between an
artist's moral rights and a parodist's right to "conjure up" and fundamentally
change that work' to achieve the desired parodic effect.
Two further difficulties arise in connection with a compulsory license
scheme. The first relates to the essence of the right of integrity. Designed toprotect an artist's honor and reputation, the right would be threatened into
extinction if the author is forced to "approve" the parodist's use by compulsorylicense. The second difficulty relates to the nature of parody, which thrives,perhaps, on its iconoclastic and unpermitted status. Compulsory license, thoughfreeing the parodist from liability, takes away from the zing that is the essence
of parody, the "civil disobedience"' of art. A compulsory license affects
negatively the transgressive quality of parody. 6  How can you "up the
establishment" if the establishment says "right on?"
B. Limitation of Remedies
While the first solution, compulsory license, affects the "liability" phase,
this second alternative focuses on the "damage" phase. We assume that a
342. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
343. See Goldstein, supra note 338, at 1127 n.83.344. In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court recognized the need for conjuring up the original work.Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1176 (1994).345. John Carlin, Remarks at A.A.L.S. Intellectual Property Law Section (Orlando, Jan. 7,1994). Dr. Carlin is an art historian, former Professor of Art History, sometime curator at theWhitney Museum of American Art, and Director of the Red Hot Organization, New York. Inspeaking about the history of the appropriation art movement in the visual arts, Dr. Carlin calledDuchamp the "King of appropriation." Id. In balancing the interests implicated in appropriation
art, Carlin proposes, inter alia, a model, voluntary license agreement. See John Carlin, CultureVultures: Artistic Appropriation and Intellectual Property Law, 13 CoLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTs 103,
139-41 (1988).
346. Cf A.A.L.S., supra note 345 (Remarks of Prof. Peter Jaszi).
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parodist has been found liable to the original artist through infringement and a
failed fair use defense. As described earlier, the Copyright Act affords to
copyright owners, including those who assert moral rights' violations, a full
range of remedies including injunctions, damages, and profits. 7 One way to
accommodate the interests of the parodist and the first artist is to tinker with the
remedy phase.
One model that would preserve an artist's honor and reputation while
alleviating the hit on the parodist's purse would permit an injunction, but no
money damages or profits. However, this would ill-serve our copyright goal to
encourage more art. Injunctions are silencers. Permanent injunctions involving
works of a derivative nature, such as parody, are frequently blanketed. That is,
a court will enjoin dissemination of the whole parody, even if it consists of both
infringing and non-infringing material since they are often "inextricably
intertwined."' Thus, parodies would neither be seen nor heard. Further, it
is questionable whether an injunction truly protects artistic honor. Injunctions
might be issued too late to ameliorate the "dissing" effect of the parody while
pre-publication injunctions are generally disfavored as prior censorship.'
A second possibility is to eschew entirely injunctive relief and award
damages and profits to the artist whose right of integrity is sullied. This would
seem to work well when it is difficult to separate the infringing from the non-
infringing parts of the parodist's work. Where "the proportion [of the plaintiff's
work used] is so insignificant compared with the injury from stopping [the
defendant's] use. . . an injunction would be unconscionable" and the plaintiff
should recover only money damages. 3' In Acuff-Rose, the Court urged
sensitive inquiry into whether injunctive relief should be awarded "when
parodists are found to have gone beyond the bounds of fair use."35
It is not clear, however, that the legal remedy of monetary damages, as
opposed to the equitable remedy of injunctive relief, will well-serve the interests
of artist, parodist, and public, at least under the present formulation of the fair
use doctrine. It is rare that the second artist/parodist will be able to afford an
347. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (1988). See also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
348. Goldstein, supra note 338, at 725 n.7.
349. See Leval, supra note 317, at 1130-35 & n. 112. Note that Judge Leval believes that our
copyright law seems "incompatible" with moral rights. Id. at 1128.
350. Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908). Seventy-six years later,
Justice Blackmun recognized the need for a sensitive tailoring of remedies to accommodate
"traditional copyright principles." See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 500 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also A.A.L.S., supra note 345 (Remarks of
Prof. Marci Hamilton, Possible Property Models for Art Appropriation).
351. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 n.10 (1
9 9 4).
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infringement suit.352 Under the existing formulation of fair use where the
parodist has the burden of proof, the second artist may be disinclined to parody,
especially when the parody often will trample on the first artist's "honor and
reputation." Thus, the silencing problem inherent in the injunctive remedy
model may still be unsolved in the damages only model. In addition, the
damages only model does not seem to give moral rights artists what they really
want-freedom from the criticism353 that injures their honor or reputation.
C. Per Se Rule of Non-Liability
A per se rule of non-liability is an effective shield for Duchamp, but
eviscerates entirely Leonardo's section 106A rights. A right without a remedy
is, of course, no right at all. So if Congress enacted a provision, such as
section 106(B), which makes explicit that the remedies afforded by sections 501-
505 are not available in actions involving moral rights, it would render section
106A a nullity and, arguably, jeopardize our status as an adherent to Berne. 354
D. Moral Rights, Copyright, and the First Amendment
At least one author has argued that, in the context of moral rights, a first
amendment defense to liability should be established since moral and first
amendment rights inevitably conflict.355  The test would vary depending upon
the type of speech at issue. For example, "[v]iolations of the right of...
integrity engaged in for commercial purposes would be analyzed under Central
Hudson . . . ." Several other authors have recognized the delicate
relationship between copyright monopoly and first amendment freedom of
352. The noted artist and defendant, Jeff Koons, see, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2dCir.), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992), is a rare exception. Koons was a commodities broker
on Wall Street. Id. at 304. He charges extraordinarily high prices for his art works and collectorsdo not balk at paying $137,500 for a Koon's collection of vacuum cleaners. See Steven Shonack,
Posonodern Piracy: How Copyright Law Constrains Contemporary Ar, 14 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J.
281, 294 & n.114 (1994). In some sense, Koons may be thought to be an heir of Duchamp's
"Readymades."
353. C. supra note 322. Professor Gordon refers to the "anti-dissemination motives" ofplaintiffs in parody suits which have little to do with the economic value of plaintiff's copyright.
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1632 (1982).
354. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
355. See generally Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor
Before Free Speech (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Valparaiso University Law Review).356. Id. at 38-39. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980), established a four-prong test to assess commercial speech.
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speech. 7  Professor Denicola argues for a limited first amendment privilege
to allow potential users access to protected expression when traditional copyright
law does not so permit."s Professor Goldstein proposes constitutional tests
when copyright protections encroach upon "overtly constitutional 
areas. "
359
A student author opines that "[i]f the Mona Lisa were copyrighted and da Vinci
sued for infringement, Duchamp's [f]irst [a]mendment defense should clearly
prevail. ,"0
Courts, however, have been fairly uniform in rejecting first amendment
defenses in copyright cases. In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, (the
bawdy, promiscuous Mickey Mouse parody), the defendants urged that the
"First Amendment should bar any liability for their parody because otherwise
protected criticism would be discouraged."' The Ninth Circuit recognized
the possible tension between a copyright and the First Amendment but held that
the first amendment argument failed because defendants "could have expressed
their theme without copying Disney's protected expression ....
Similarly, in Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders Inc., v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc.
(poster of partially nude cheerleaders), the court noted: "The judgment of the
constitution is that free expression is enriched by protecting the creations of
authors from exploitation by others, and the Copyright Act is the congressional
implementation of that judgment .... The [F]irst [A]mendment is not a license
to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property.
"
' In 1985,
the Supreme Court forestalled further development of a separate first amendment
defense in copyright cases. In the Nation case (Nation magazine's news scoop
of Time's publication of parts of President Ford's memoirs), the Court found no
357. See, e.g., David A. Householder, The Progress of Knowledge: A Reexamination of the
Fundamental Principles of American Copyright Law, 14 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 38-42 (1993);
Floyd Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1987); Patricia Krieg,
Note, Copyright, Free Speech, and the Visual Arts, 93 YALE L.J. 1565, 1583-84 (1984); Robert C.
Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression,
67 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L.
REv. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees
of Free Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970).
358. Denicola, supra note 357, at 316.
359. Goldstein, supra note 357, at 1057.
360. Krieg, supra note 357, at 1584.
361. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978), cel. denied, 439
U.S. 1132 (1979).
362. Id. at 758-59 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
577 & n.13 (1977)).
363. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc., v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1187-88
(5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). But see Triangle Publications, Inc., v. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affid on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1171, 1178
(5th Cir. 1980). In Triangle, the district court held the defendant's use not to be fair, id. at 881,
but privileged nonetheless under the commercial speech prong of the First Amendment, id. at 884.
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inherent conflict between the Copyright Act and the First Amendment. 63"
Rather, the Court noted:
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.
By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas .... In view of the [flirst [a]mendment protections already
embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable
expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no
warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts
to a public figure exception to copyright .... [Tihe traditional
equities of fair use [should govern].'
Having shown that neither compulsory licenses, remedy tinkering, per se
non-liability, nor a separate [fjirst [a]mendment privilege will resolve
appropriately the Leonardo v. Duchamp case, we are left then with fair use-the
final barrier to liability in both section 106 and 106A cases.
E. Presumptive Fair Use for Parodists Who Violate an Artist's Right of Integrity
An analysis of the four fair use factors shows that, even in cases involving
commercial parodies and section 106A(a)(3)(A), Duchamp should be afforded
presumptive fair use. In one sense, this conclusion is made possible because
Acuff-Rose eschewed a presumption of unfairness when the use is
commercial, 3' thus levelling the playing field. What this author suggests thenis to tilt this ground. Even though the Court did not treat parody as presumptive
fair use in a property based, traditional copyright suit, this should not foreclose
shifting the burden from the defendant/parodist in a moral rights case.
Heretofore, fair use had been viewed as an affirmative defense that a defendant,
parodist or not, had to plead and prove.' In moral rights cases based on
infringement of the right of integrity, the first artist should bear the burden of
pleading and proving that a review of the four section 107 factors shows that the
parodist's use was unfair. This adjustment of the fair use doctrine to accomplish
the desired effect is not foreclosed by section 107. Section 107 represents not
the "creation of new law," but rather "a direction to the courts to continue to
364. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). See
also supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
365. Id. at 558, 560.
366. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1174 (1994).
367. Id. at 1177.
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develop the common law"' as they had from the days of Justice Story in
Folsom v. Marsh.' Faced with a bundle of new rights, such as the personal
right of integrity, courts should be free to tailor the fair use doctrine to the
particular case. This is, in fact, what courts have done since 1841.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
Parody, as criticism or comment, is one of the favored purposes specified
in section 107. Though not affording parody a per se non-infringement status,
such productive, transformative material is often treated as fair use, even when
it is for-profit."3 As is often the case, a parody "adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering . . . with new expression,
meaning, or message" the host work and thus, it furthers -the goal of copyright,
to promote science and the arts."371 Because parody relies on recognition of
the host work, it necessarily "copies" at least enough of that work to conjure it
up for the viewing or listening public. Thus, a parody that comments upon,
targets, or criticizes the original work, as L.H.O.O.Q. surely does, is the focus
of section 107.
Additionally, it is no longer crucial that Duchamp exhibited L.H.O.O.Q.
at a local art gallery and sold the painting to an enamored viewer. The
presumption of unfairness attached to commercial use, arguably arising from the
Harper & Row3 2 and Sony cases," exists no more.
374
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
Nor is it critical that Duchamp copied Leonardo's creative expression
(rather than a fact-based work). Acuff-Rose teaches that "[tis fact ... is not
much help. . . in separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats in a
parody case, since parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive
works." 375  So, although the Mona Lisa "falls within the core of . . .
368. Patry & Perlmutter, supra note 14, at 674; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236
(1990).
369. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901).
370. See, e.g., Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1164 (holding that 2 Live Crew's parody may be fair
use); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986); Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors
Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. 111. 1991); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
371. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994).
372. Harper & Rose, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
373. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
374. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1174.
375. Id. at 1175.
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copyright's protective purposes,"376 the L.H.O.O.Q.s of this world must
conjure up that creative expression. To afford any weight to Leonardo on this
score is, for all practical purposes, to destroy parody as a genre.
3. The Amount and Substantiality of Defendant's Use
Under this Article's scheme, Leonardo would have the burden here, as with
the other 107 factors, to show that both the quantity and quality" of
Duchamp's use exceeds the boundaries of fairness. This determination should
be made with a view "to the copyrighted work as a whole. " " Because "the
extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of the
use, " 379 Duchamp's parody necessarily must evoke the Mona Lisa to succeed
at all as parody. The problem here, of course, is that unlike 2 Live Crew's less
than 100% use of Roy Orbison's song,m Duchamp has taken 100% of
Leonardo's work and merely added some hair to lip and chin and changed the
title. Leonardo would have to show then that this use went far beyond the
necessity to conjure up his Mona Lisa. The conjure up test recognizes that
Duchamp must use the "most distinctive or memorable features, which the
parodist can be sure the audience will know, " " but it might be argued that
Duchamp went beyond the pale. On the other hand, the iconographic stature
and nature of the Mona Lisa as a portrait suggests that to parody it at all
requires almost an entire appropriation. In fact, virtually all the other artists
who have parodied the Mona Lisa have used it almost in its entirety.' Thus,
parody of a visual art, which is the only type of work protected under section
106A, may necessitate a more complete appropriation than a parody of a non-
106A work such as a song or a play. Less than verbatim copying of "I Love
New York"' or "Oh Pretty Woman"3 4 may still result in parody, while
visual art parodies may require very substantial, near verbatim, copying.'
376. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1175 (1994).
377. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564-566, 568
(1985).
378. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
379. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct at 1175.
380. Id. at 1176-77.
381. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1176 (1994). Cf. Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The
keystone of parody is imitation.").
382. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
383. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("I Love Sodom.").
384. Capbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
385. Justice Kennedy suggests this conclusion in Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Cf. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.05D, at 13-211-225 (1994) ("inhere
may be certain very limited situations wherein copying of even the entire work for a different
functional purpose may be regarded as fair use."). Although the text refers to use in judicial
proceedings, incidental reproduction, and reverse engineering of computer software, it does cite
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Under the scheme this Article proposes, Leonardo would have to show that the
use was not true parody (factor 1) and, if it was, that the conjure up test could
be satisfied by far less than what Duchamp appropriated.
4. The Effect of Duchamp's Use Upon the Potential Market for or Value
of the Mona Lisa
Although "[t]his last factor is undoubtedly the single most important
element of fair use,"' the impairment of the marketability of the underlying
work is affected differently when the use is parody, rather than another form of
use. As both Fisher and Acuff-Rose note, the economic effect of parody is not
its likelihood of destroying or lessening the market for the original, which any
parody as critique may do, but rather whether the parody has a substitutive
effect on the host work.' "[P]arody may quite legitimately aim at garroting
the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically," but that is not
the harm encompassed by copyright law.'
In some ways it is difficult to apply this fourth fair use factor to a right of
integrity claim. Section 107(4) focuses on Leonardo's pocket, not upon attacks
on his artistic sensibilities of honor and reputation. Yet, Congress notes that
expert testimony can show whether the use actually affects the honor or
reputation of the artist." Presumably this testimony will proffer evidence as
to whether damage to reputation is indicated by actual or potential deleterious
market effects on the Mona Lisa. However, the Supreme Court cautions that
when "the second use is transformative," as in parody, "market substitution is
at least less certain and market harm may not be so readily inferred.""
Further, Leonardo's market for other permitted derivative parodying works is
somewhere between slim and none. As demonstrated earlier, artists are unlikely
Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, 626 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986), where the court held that full
reproduction of a fine art postcard was necessary for the purpose of comment.
386. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(citations omitted).
387. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1177-79;
Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1181 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
388. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (citing BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF
COPYRIGHT 69 (1967)).
389. See supra note 197.
390. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164,1177 (1994). Cf. H.R. REP. No.
2237, 89th Cong., 2d Seas. 64 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 35 (1967) ("[W]ith
certain exceptons (use in parodies or as evidence in court proceedings.. .) a use which supplants
any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an
infringement.") (emphasis added); Patty & Perlmutter, supra note 14, at 693 (stating that, in most
parody cases, the effect on plaintiff's potential market "will tend to weigh in favor of fair use" since
there is little chance the parody will supplant the market for the original).
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to authorize criticism or to license disparagement. 9' There is little or "no
derivative market for critical works. "'
To shift the burden of pleading and proof on this factor from Duchamp to
Leonardo in a right of integrity case does not seem unfair for several reasons.
First, section 106(A)(a)(3)(A)'s concept of prejudice to honor or reputation is
relatively amorphous. It tracks the language of article 6" of Berne, but in our
country honor and reputation issues have arisen mostly in conjunction with
defamation law which, at least since 1964, outermost limits have been expressly
constrained by the First Amendment. 3' In copyright law, fair use itself is
thought to represent the compromise, the "breathing space" between copyright
monopoly and First Amendment free expression interests, 39" but the
reputational interests in right of integrity cases are not so unlike those in
defamation cases where the plaintiff does bear the burden of proof.'
The second reason that supports the shift of burden to demonstrate negative
market effect from Duchamp to Leonardo relates to access to such proof. "Such
proof is peculiarly in the hands of the copyright owner, and consequently he
should have the burden of proof."' Presumably, Leonardo knows whether
prejudice to his honor or reputation has occurred. For example, the price of his
lithograph series has dropped significantly since and because of Duchamp's
parody.3" Further, Leonardo already has to show reputation damage in
conjunction with his 106A suit, so we would not be imposing a new and difficult
burden.
391. See supra notes 241-42, 244 and accompanying text. Cy. Strauss, supra note 10, at 534.
392. Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1178.
393. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Negative opinions, such as most
parodies, that ridicule plaintiffs are constitutionally protected. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46 (1988).
394. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 (1994). See also supra notes
357-60 and accompanying text.
395. In defamation cases, the plaintiff must proffer evidence "from which harm to reputation
could reasonably be inferred or direct evidence of harm to reputation." W. PAGE KEETrON Er AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 797 (student ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 613, 621 (1977). Section 613(0 states that the plaintiff has the burden to prove special
harm resulting from the defendant's defamatory statement. Special harm is construed to mean
economic injury and is presumed in defamation per se. Id. §§ 568, 570.
396. Copyright Law Revision: Part 5 1964 Revision Bill with Discussions and Comments, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 98-100 (Comm. Print 1965) (Remarks of Harry N. Rosenfield, counsel for the Ad
Hoc Committee of Educational Organizations on Copyright Law Revision). Although Rosenfield's
comments were made in the context of nonprofit educational uses, it is equally applicable in right
of integrity/parody cases.
397. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
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5. The Effect of Burden Shifting
In the easiest cases, where the defendant's use is productive but not parody
and not-for-profit, or non-productive and for profit,3 it might make little
difference who carries the burden of pleading and proving the four fair use
factors. But, in harder cases where the parody, which strikes at the artist's right
of integrity, is a commercial use or even not-for-profit, 3" the potential
censoring effect of section 106A(a)(3)(A)W is mitigated by shifting proof of
the fair use factors from Duchamp to Leonardo. In "hard" moral rights cases,
doubts should be resolved in favor of the parodist. °1  We should have more
art rather than less. This solution balances appropriately the three interests
served by current copyright law-protection of an artist's personal, moral, and
proprietary (economic) rights, protection of the parodist's right to create
transformative works, and protection of the public's interest in fostering the kind
of creativity which promotes science and the arts.') 2 This tinkering with what
had been viewed as the affirmative nature of the fair use defense is necessary
due to the attempt to fit a square peg into a round hole-natural, personal, moral
rights into an economic rights-based copyright scheme. 3  In this regard, it
398. See supra notes 278-84 (Fair Use Continuum, Parts I, IV).
399. See supra notes 279-81, 283-84 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 326 and accompanying text. Cf. Yen, supra note 14 at 107 ("[A]uthors
[may] value their copyright rights for non-monetary reasons . . . [and] authors will consistently
refuse to sell others the rights to use their works because money will not be an adequate substitute
for any interests harmed by the contemplated use."). Granting authors an "aesthetic veto" has
resulted in numerous European decisions in which expression has been prevented. See Robert A.
Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REv. 422, 424-27
& nn.3-15 (1990).
401. In a non-moral rights claim, doubts would be resolved in favor of the first artist. See
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1181 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
402. Cf. Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1025 (1994) ("[Clopyright law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works.. .. "); Acuff
Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1171 (stating that transformative works are "at the heart of the fair use
doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright"); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (stating that copyright "rewards the individual author
in order to benefit the public"); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429 (1984) (holding that copyright "makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration")
(quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)). That these goals
remain the core of copyright is evidenced by section 801's balancing of maximizing the availability
of creative works to the public and giving the copyright owner a fair return and the user a fair
income. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A), (B) (1988).
403. Cf. Leval, supra note 317, at 1128 ("Our copyright law has developed over hundreds of
years for a very different purpose and with rules and inconsequences that are incompatible with the
droit moral.'). Judge Leval authored two important copyright/fair use decisions that did not survive
appellate review: New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), affid on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650
F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
His fair use article was frequently cited by the Supreme Court in Acuff-Rose, 114 S. Ct. at 1170 &
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should be noted that most countries that provide moral rights protection do not
recognize a fair use defense.') 4
V. CONCLUSION
"Vita brevis est, ars longa"'
"Whatever else art is good for, its chief effectiveness lies in propagating
more art . . . [O]f all the things art has an impact on, art is the most
susceptible and responsive. All art is infested by other art."' This is hardly
surprising given the nature of the artistic muse. Robert Motherwell, a noted
American artist of this century, explained the import of prior art: "Every
intelligent painter carries the whole culture of modem painting in his head. It
is his real subject, of which everything he paints is both an homage and a
critique."' Contrary to the advice given by Polonius to his son Laertes,
"Neither a borrower nor a lender be,"" many artists have their feet (or
paintbrushes, pens, sculpting tools, pianos, etc.) in both camps. They use ideas,
plots, and themes, often parodying earlier works, while still other artists feed
on this art. In this sense, much art is symbiotic. That legal doctrine which can
protect both the "host" artist and the "parasite" artist, or at least balance
carefully the interests of both, best serves the artistic and cultural needs of
society and "promote[s] the progress of science and the useful arts
But the balance is a delicate one. Too much protection for the "host" artist can
stifle creation of new, transformative works. Too much protection for the
second artist might cause the original artist to lose the incentive to create.
Because art begets art,410 society wants to furnish incentives for artists to
create. Copyright is one vehicle by which to accomplish this. The monopolistic
property and moral rights given to authors under sections 106 and 106A of the
Copyright Act, even though explicitly tempered by fair use, section 107, and
other specific limitations, sections 108-120, are in inherent conflict with the
ability to create freely and without fear of lawsuits. Courts have, however,
endeavored to resolve the conflict by employing, often successfully, the fair use
doctrine on a case-by-case basis in traditional, "property" rights cases. Whether
n.8, 1171 & n.10, 1174n.18, 1177 n.21, 1178 & n.23.
404. See Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright Protection: The United States and
European Community Positions, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 301, 320 (1992).
405. SENECA, DE BREvITATE VITAE, I, 1.
406. LiMAN & MARsHALL, supra note 205, at 9.
407. Id. at 7.
408. WILLLAm SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET: PRINCE OF DENMARK, act I, sc. iii, line 75.
409. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
410. "Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is
a remaking." NELSON GOODMEN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 6 (1978).
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there can be a similar successful use of the doctrine as an affirmative defense
on such an ad hoc basis in the context of moral rights, that is, Leonardo's
freedom from an "intentional distortion, mutilation, or. . . modification of his
* . . work which would be prejudicial to his . . . honor or reputation,""" is
much more problematic. This is so for several reasons. First, a moral rights
violation is fuzzier than a property right violation. Second, it must be conceded
that artists rarely seek out criticism and at most endure it grudgingly. This, in
turn, raises a third difficulty: artists could use section 106A to chill or prevent
art. Since monopoly is the linchpin of copyright, artists may use the new grant
of moral rights to censor.
Because of these concerns, this Article proposed that when moral rights
under section 106A are asserted against a parodist, such as Duchamp in the
hypothetical case delineated here, a court should presume that the parodist's use
is a fair one, even if it is a commercial use. This presumption recognizes the
need to protect both da Vinci and Duchamp, but gives Duchamp, as parodist,
the benefit of a fair use presumption in section 106A/right of integrity cases.
Language in Supreme Court fair use cases prior to Acuff-Rose indicates that the
Court is not too uncomfortable with speaking in terms of presumptions in the
property rights/fair use/non-parody context. 1 2  In the moral rights/fair
use/parody context, Duchamp should, presumptively, win.
411. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (a)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
412. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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